Culture, self, and cognition: adding Africa to the mix by Janse van Rensburg, Gerard
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
Culture, Self, and Cognition: 
Adding Africa to the Mix 
 
 
 
 
Gerard Janse van Rensburg 
JNSGER006 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of 
Master of Arts (Psychological Research) 
 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2017 
 
Supervisor: Dr Colin Tredoux 
Faculty of the Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPULSORY DECLARATION 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any 
degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation 
from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and 
referenced. 
Signature:        Date: 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Colin Tredoux for all of his support in structuring 
my research, helping me understand the practicalities of running a project such as this, and 
providing me with his vast knowledge of statistics when things became complicated. 
 
I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students Alicia, Kate, and Katie for allowing 
me to bounce my ideas off them and for all the feedback on my results and design throughout 
this project. 
 
I would also like to thank my wife, Jonelle du Pont, for supporting me through this journey, 
for being the anthropology background I lacked, for pushing me to meet my deadlines, and 
especially for reminding me that a good dissertation is a done dissertation, a great dissertation 
is a published dissertation, and a perfect one is neither! 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank my son Oden for making the last year of this thesis one crazy 
experience, but each day better than the next. 
 
This study was supported by grants from the National Research Foundation (NRF).
Contents 
 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. ii 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. iii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1: Defining Culture........................................................................................... 2 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2 
What is Culture? ........................................................................................................ 2 
Becoming Cultured .................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 2: Culture and the Self .................................................................................... 14 
Behaviour in context ............................................................................................ 14 
Multiculturalism in a diverse world ..................................................................... 17 
Cultural differences in social orientation ............................................................. 18 
The antecedents of self-concept differences ........................................................ 20 
Caveats in understanding the self and culture...................................................... 23 
Measuring Individualism and Collectivism ......................................................... 25 
Selfhood in South Africa ..................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 3: Culture, Self, and Cognition ....................................................................... 34 
Linking culture with cognition: IND-COL & ANA-HOL ................................... 35 
The self and visual attention ................................................................................ 36 
The absence of Africa .......................................................................................... 39 
Rationale, Specific Aims, and Hypotheses. ............................................................. 40 
Chapter 4: Methodology & Results ............................................................................. 43 
IND-COL Measurement .......................................................................................... 43 
ANA-HOL Measurement......................................................................................... 55 
Summary of Results ................................................................................................. 71 
Chapter 5: Discussion .................................................................................................. 73 
Limitations and future directions ............................................................................. 84 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 85 
References .................................................................................................................... 87 
 
 
  
ii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Five main approaches to studying cultural impact on human psychological 
characteristics. ................................................................................................................ 6 
Table 2. Processes of the CAD ...................................................................................... 9 
Table 3. Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale and scoring . 43 
Table 4. Participant Demographics .............................................................................. 44 
Table 5. Cronbach's Alphas for HVIC Scale ............................................................... 45 
Table 6. Test-retest correlations for HVIC scales ........................................................ 45 
Table 7. HVIC Scale correlations ................................................................................ 46 
Table 8. Factor Loadings for the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and 
Collectivism scale ........................................................................................................ 48 
Table 9. HVIC combined IND-COL scale descriptive statistics ................................. 50 
Table 10. HVIC subscales descriptive statistics .......................................................... 52 
Table 11. R2 and Beta coefficients for survey regression models ............................... 54 
Table 12. ANA-HOL study participant demographics ................................................ 56 
Table 13. Eye-tracking Measures IND-COL Means Comparisons ............................. 64 
Table 14. Object Recognition Results ......................................................................... 65 
Table 15. Eye-tracking Background vs Focal Object Comparisons ............................ 67 
Table 16. Object Recognition Image Combinations Accuracy Comparisons ............. 67 
Table 17. Cohen's ds for means comparisons between groups .................................... 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Illustration of the Cultural Cognitive-Affective Processing System (C-
CAPS). ......................................................................................................................... 16 
Figure 2. Task Analysis Framework (reproduced from Kitayama et al., 2009). ......... 24 
Figure 3. Framework for IND-COL & ANA-HOL relationship ................................. 36 
Figure 4. Scree plot of eigenvalues for HVIC factor analysis ..................................... 47 
Figure 5. IND-COL Scores By Race ........................................................................... 51 
Figure 6. IND-COL Scores By Language .................................................................... 51 
Figure 7. Phase 1 Sample image .................................................................................. 59 
Figure 8. Phase 1 Sample image .................................................................................. 59 
Figure 9. Phase 1 Original Image ................................................................................ 60 
Figure 10. Phase 1 Original Image .............................................................................. 60 
Figure 11. Phase 2 Altered Background ...................................................................... 60 
Figure 12. Phase 2 Altered Focal Object ..................................................................... 60 
Figure 13. Experiment Procedure ................................................................................ 61 
Figure 14. Fixation Duration Heat Map ....................................................................... 63 
Figure 15. Fixation Duration Heat Map - COL Group ................................................ 63 
Figure 16. Fixations and Saccades Movement Pattern ................................................ 63 
Figure 17. Fixation Duration Heat Map - IND Group ................................................. 63 
Figure 18. Average amount of visits to background and focal objects ........................ 66 
Figure 19. Average total amount of time spent looking at background and focal 
objects .......................................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 20. Average fixations on background and focal objects................................... 66 
Figure 21. Average time spent looking at backgrounds or focal objects ..................... 66 
Figure 22. Mean scores for object recognition by image type ..................................... 68 
Figure 23. Mean Fixation Count within Focal Object and Background AOIs. ........... 68 
Figure 24. Mean Total Visit Duration within Focal Object and Background AOIs .... 68 
Figure 25. Mean fixation duration for Backgrounds and Focal Objects...................... 70 
Figure 26. Mean correct answers (in %) during Object Recognition task for Old 
Objects on New Backgrounds ...................................................................................... 70 
1 
 
Abstract 
 
Cross-cultural differences in cognition have been well established across the world, 
and differences in Individualism (IND) and Collectivism (COL) are believed to underlie the 
majority of these cultural variations. IND-COL measures are frequently used to categorise 
nations as either IND or COL and these nations are subsequently used to draw IND or COL 
samples for comparison on various cognitive tasks. The multicultural nature of South Africa 
and inconsistent findings on IND-COL in SA makes such IND-COL categorisation 
problematic. African nations have also been conspicuously missing from international cross-
cultural research on culture and cognition. This study set out to explore the utility of IND-
COL measures in South Africa, with special regard to possible racial or linguistic differences. 
It also set out to remedy the absence of African nations in the international literature by 
replicating a previous study on culture and cognition within a South African sample. 
The shortened HVIC scale by Triandis and Gelfand (1998) was used to explore racial 
and linguistic differences in terms of IND-COL within a South African university population 
(N = 1380). Psychometric analyses showed good reliability, internal consistency, and 
construct validity. Regression analysis revealed race and language as poor predictors of IND. 
COL prediction was marginally better, accounting for 8.2% of variance, and with African 
Language as a significant predictor (beta = -.432, p < .01). To address the absence of Africa 
in the literature, replication of the eye-tracking and memory study by Chua et al. (2005) was 
attempted in a South African university population (N = 52). Due to the multicultural nature 
of South Africa, participants were recruited and sorted according to scores on a shortened 
version of the HVIC into an IND group (n = 25) and a COL group (n = 27). After correcting 
for outliers, no significant differences were found between the two groups regarding eye-
movement patterns or memory. The two SA groups did, however, differ significantly from 
the American group but not the Chinese group in the original study by Chua et al. (2005).  
Discrepancies in IND-COL research in SA are likely due to a lack of 
comprehensiveness in terms of the cultural tasks included in the surveys. Increasing 
acculturation in post-Apartheid South Africa, especially among university students, may also 
play a large role. Further issues regarding IND-COL measurement in South Africa, as well as 
issues surrounding IND-COL measurement internationally were also discussed. 
Methodological issues in studying the links between IND-COL and cognition within a South 
African context were likely the reason behind the lack of differences found in this study in 
terms of eye-movement patterns and memory for the two SA groups.  
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Chapter 1: Defining Culture 
Introduction 
For most of its history the field of psychology has maintained the belief that in 
understanding the behaviour of the individual one can understand all human behaviour 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Research from the past few decades, however, has 
increasingly begun to show that the individual cannot really be understood in isolation; that 
humans are inherently social beings, and as such must be viewed within their unique social 
contexts in order to gain a truly comprehensive understanding of their behaviour and 
cognition (Henrich et al., 2010). Much of this research has involved comparing the 
behaviours and cognitive strategies of individuals from different parts of the world during 
various tasks. These tasks ranged from asking individuals to determine causative factors in an 
event, recounting memories from their past, or simply looking at and memorising pictures. 
While people from many nations or cultures across the world have been studied, Africa in 
general, and South Africa in particular, have been widely ignored or left out in studying the 
link between culture and cognitive processes. This study set out to begin filling this gap in the 
literature by testing one of the major assumptions on how culture influences cognition within 
a South African sample: the notion that an individual’s sense of self or self-concept affects 
how they direct visual attention when viewing a visual scene. It will also further explore, 
within a South African sample, the measurement of arguably the most important set of 
variables in cultural psychology, that of Individualism (IND) and Collectivism (COL). 
What is Culture? 
Cultural psychology is the study of how the human social world fundamentally shapes 
our behaviour (Markus & Hamedani, 2010). It is the merging of our understanding of the 
basic building blocks of the mind with our understanding of the broader social context within 
which we exist. 
Since its very conception the behaviour of the individual has mostly been the focus of 
study within the field of psychology. The inclusion of culture, on the other hand, has had a 
somewhat inconsistent history in building our understanding behaviour (Triandis, 2010). 
Definitions regarding the behaviour of the individual are therefore quite abundant, and often 
well-defined and validated within psychology. Definitions of culture, however, are not. 
Accurate and well defined operationalisation of constructs being studied is a well-known 
standard for any research endeavour. Without a proper definition of culture, however, how 
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can one start understanding individual behaviour through a cultural lens? Luckily, scholars in 
the field of anthropology have for centuries been dealing with this issue of defining what 
‘culture’ actually is; how one can say “this is the culture of people X and this is the culture of 
people Y” (Baldwin, Faulkner, & Hecht, 2006; Cole & Scribner, 1974). Cultural 
psychologists have therefore naturally drawn on this source of information to create new 
interdisciplinary definitions of culture and how it applies to individual human behaviour. 
 
One of the first, and very influential, anthropological conceptualisations of ‘culture’ 
comes from Edward Tylor (1920). He described culture as “that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society” (p. 1). The individual is not seen as functioning in 
isolation, but is heavily influenced by the society that he or she is a member of. Culture is 
also seen as something accumulated by collectives as a whole, and is comprised of abstract as 
well as material objects that are reflective of that society in general. Tylor’s definition is, 
however, somewhat static, with no acknowledgement of the fluidity and ambiguity that 
cultures typically exhibit. Tylor also saw culture as evolving according to a certain step-wise 
progressive hierarchy, with cultures evolving from some primitive state to the “civilised” 
ideal as epitomised by European societies. This idea of progressive cultural evolution was 
thoroughly discredited by later generations of anthropologists (Durham, 1990).  
Definitions of what ‘culture’ is have kept on growing and changing over the 
subsequent decades (Baldwin et al., 2006). Almost a century later, through a systematic 
review of the various definitions of culture in use at the time, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1954; 
as cited in Baldwin et al. (2006)) created a more developed and elaborated definition. 
According to them culture consisted not only of specific identifiable objects, whether abstract 
or material, but also specific patterns of behaviour. These patterns of behaviour may be 
embodied or transmitted through the use of objects or symbols, but what is important is that 
they are derived and selected throughout a collective’s social history by the values that people 
attached to them. A group’s behaviour over time is heavily influenced by the values and 
norms they espouse. These values and norms are often embodied or exemplified by specific 
symbols, such as a flag or a religious icon. The pervasiveness of such symbols or objects 
helps maintain and spread the norms or values that they embody amongst the people and the 
younger generations. A very important distinction they also expressed was that culture should 
not only be seen as the product of behaviour, but also have a shaping force of future 
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behaviour. That is to say, culture is shaped and in turn shapes human behaviour through a 
dynamic and intricate interplay between the two. 
While this new refinement of the concept of ‘culture’ was met with much wider 
agreement among scholars, it was still not wholly accepted by all. It did, however, express 
certain trends that would emerge more and more in future definitions, including those used by 
cultural psychologists (Baldwin et al., 2006; Triandis, 2010). 
Firstly, most modern definitions usually accept that culture is a product of human 
interactions with their social environments. They also accept that culture in turn shapes future 
human interactions with this social environment; that there is a dynamic interplay and co-
creation between humans and their social environment. Secondly, they also acknowledge that 
culture consists of various abstract or material objects, as well as practices or rituals, that are 
shared between people. Of special importance are the shared meanings or values that people 
attach to these practices or objects, i.e. the social norms shared between people. Lastly, 
culture essentially functions as a repository of collective knowledge, and if knowledge is not 
shared, it will eventually be lost. Consequently, it is also generally accepted that a key 
element of culture is that it is transmitted among people or collectives. More precisely, that 
culture is formed and evolves through the transmission of the “units of knowledge” regarding 
concepts, ideas, abstract artefacts, or practices between people or collectives.  
 
Taken altogether, culture can therefore be defined as the behavioural and cognitive 
expressions of the social rituals, norms, values, and abstract symbols or concepts shared 
within and between groups of people. This definition no longer views culture as located 
within the individual as some sort of inherent concrete trait, but is rather seen as a 
dynamically constituted product created through the interactions between the person, other 
people, their social history, and their environment. It captures quite well the dynamic and 
fluid nature of culture and how it is expressed by individuals as well as collectives. For 
instance, as a group’s social environment changes, be it through migration, war, or contact 
with other cultures, so do the adaptive behavioural patterns change which creates new norms 
or values and consequently a new cultural dynamic (Newson, Richerson, & Boyd, 2010); or 
the broken-telephone nature of teaching and learning between generations may also subtly 
alter the various rituals or symbols, thus creating or introducing new abstract symbols or 
rituals and thus changing behavioural patterns (Newson et al., 2010). Individual behaviour 
can now be seen as inextricably linked with the individual’s relationships with others, as well 
as with the vast accumulation of collective knowledge and practices embodied within their 
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families, communities, and greater social environment. The individual is no longer 
individual, but one small piece of a much larger whole. 
The idea that social context influences human behaviour is not actually such a new 
concept, as from the early 1900’s anthropological researchers such as Franz Boas and Edward 
Sapir had already begun looking into culturally situated psychologies (LeVine, 2010). 
Behavioural models incorporating cultural dynamics began falling out of favour, however, as 
the rise of behaviourism and cognitive psychology started taking hold throughout Western 
Europe and especially in the US (Nisbett, 2010). Behaviour was seen as a function of input-
output computations, with the “organism” playing a very small part in these computations. 
Furthermore, various methodological issues also plagued cultural research during this time, 
further lowering its scientific “status” among psychological researchers of the time, 
especially when compared to the then more rigorous methods employed by the behaviourists 
(Nisbett, 2010).  
A small group of researchers, however, continued doing cultural research, both within 
the US and in other parts of the world such as Soviet Russia and Japan (Nisbett, 2010). Over 
time these researchers honed the various methods and experimental techniques used in 
cultural research and started producing results with undeniable scientific and empirical merit 
(Nisbett, 2010). Due to the efforts of these researchers a new wave of interest in cultural 
psychology started building. Beginning in the late 80’s the importance of culture started 
gaining more and more recognition once again, culminating in the flood of new research in 
cultural psychology seen in recent years (Nisbett, 2010). Studying the role of culture was no 
longer simply the realm of anthropologists or social psychologists, but an integral part of any 
holistic study of human behaviour and cognition.  
Approaches to studying culture and behaviour 
The new wave of cultural research brought about a number of methodologies and 
research techniques uniquely suited to studying this link between culture and the mind. 
Building upon  these modern definitions of culture and improved research techniques, a 
number of approaches have arisen that attempt to incorporate the relationship between culture 
and the individual in studying behaviour (Markus & Hamedani, 2010). Although these 
approaches are not mutually exclusive, different cultural psychologists tend to use 
qualitatively different frameworks within which to study the interactions between culture and 
psychology. Naturally, the type of approach used is usually dependent on the type of question 
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each researcher is seeking to answer. These approaches can be broadly categorized into five 
different types (See Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Five main approaches to studying cultural impact on human psychological 
characteristics. 
APPROACH EMPIRICAL GOAL MECHANISM OF 
CONSTITUTION 
EXAMPLE 
Dimensional Specify the dimensions 
of culture that explain 
differences in attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviours 
Worldviews, beliefs, 
values, attitudes 
translate the 
sociocultural in the 
psychological 
Horizontal-vertical 
relationships 
dimensions.  
Models Specify models that 
organise the links 
between the 
sociocultural and self-
systems. 
Psychological 
tendencies, meanings, 
practices, and products 
reflect, foster, and 
sustain one another.  
Influencing-adjusting 
models of agency 
Cognitive Toolkit Specify how cultural 
meanings and practices 
can influence basic 
cognitive tendencies. 
Attention and 
perception are guided 
by cognitive tools or 
sets of interpretive 
tools. 
Holistic-analytic 
cognition 
Ecocultural Specify how ecological 
and socio-political 
factors influence 
psychological 
adaptation to a context. 
Cultural adaptation and 
transmission shape the 
development and 
display of basic human 
characteristics. 
Variations in cognitive 
competence  
Dynamic 
Constructivist 
Specify the situational 
factors and boundary 
conditions that govern 
cultural influence 
Particular knowledge 
structures/implicit 
theories are activated by 
situational cues in a 
given situation. 
Bicultural frame 
switching. 
Note: (adapted from Markus & Hamedani (2010, figure 1.1) 
 
The purpose of this study is to attempt to draw connections between culture and how 
the mind works at a fundamental level, for which the Cognitive Toolkit approach would be 
useful. According to this approach, human cognition can essentially be seen as a set of 
cognitive capabilities utilized to interact with and adapt to the different environments that 
individuals and collectives encounter over time (Markus & Hamedani, 2010; Norenzayan, 
Choi, & Peng, 2010). These cognitive capabilities are therefore ‘tools’ used in daily 
interactions between people or collectives and their environment. They are cultural ways of 
thinking, mental heuristics for problem solving passed on through generations. Just as 
specific occupational demands require specific tools (e.g., a carpenter requires a saw and a 
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surgeon requires a scalpel), specific ecological demands require specific cognitive heuristics 
or tools. Because the ecological niches that the various human groups came to occupy 
throughout history differed greatly, these groups required different tools in order to 
successfully interact with and adapt to their unique environments. As a consequence, the 
cognitive ‘toolkit’ each group developed over time became more and more specialised to 
better deal with their unique environmental demands. The Cognitive Toolkit approach is 
primarily focused on how “tools” differ across populations and cultures, e.g. which cognitive 
styles or ways of thinking are more prevalent in use amongst which groups or cultures? It 
does not, however, delve far into how the cultural contexts within which people exist came 
about or why certain cultures created certain variations in toolkits. For this the Sociocultural 
Models approach and Ecocultural approach are most useful (Markus & Hamedani, 2010). 
The Sociocultural Models approach maintains that culture, as the embodiment of the 
shared meanings, norms, rituals, and abstract symbols that a group of people possess and 
express, provides a kind of blueprint for social behaviour. It informs the individual of what is 
true, beautiful, right, and good in the world, and also what is not. It provides form and 
direction for the individual in his or her daily social interactions. People share these 
blueprints or schemas on how to understand and experience the world, and it is the variations 
in these schemas that the Sociocultural Models approach studies (Markus & Hamedani, 
2010). Through understanding how different groups construct their blueprints of reality, the 
effects of cultural variations on behaviour can be teased apart far more accurately. Does a 
specific group, for instance, place great value on healing and medicine, or do they value 
crafting wooden sculptures or constructing building? Those groups that value crafting more 
would focus more on creating those tools suited to their goals and values (saws), whilst 
eschewing those that do not (scalpels). 
Both the Cognitive Toolkit and Sociocultural Models approaches tend to focus a large 
part on individual functioning, or cultural variations at the micro-level. Culture, however, 
operates on a number of different levels, from the micro to the macro, and teasing apart the 
influences of these various levels is where the Ecocultural approach is most useful (Markus & 
Hamedani, 2010). The Ecocultural approach is focused on understanding the various macro 
level factors that can influence and shape the micro level factors of culture. It pays special 
attention to the socio-political and ecological factors that drove cultural change within and 
between groups. It draws strongly on evolutionary theories of population level changes in 
response to or in conjunction with environmental changes in trying to understand how and 
why certain cultural variations came about at the societal level. It then attempts to link these 
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with the individual or small scale group level behavioural and cognitive dynamics. How did 
this group come to value crafting more than surgery? What ecological or socio-political 
factors in their past and their present pushed them to value this more? Perhaps the economic 
climate and expansion of industry created a greater need for carpenters, or perhaps an 
oversupply of surgeons from another group decreased the need for such specialisation. These 
various macro-level factors change and shape the way in which the value of carpentry and 
subsequently saws are viewed or emphasised within a group. 
The Sociocultural approach essentially looks at how culture shapes the psychological 
foundation from which people interact with their world. The Cognitive Toolkit approach 
looks at the various cognitive tools which people employ to interact and engage with their 
world. The Ecocultural approach looks at how the various sociocultural factors came about 
that actually shapes this psychological foundation and subsequently the tools employed by 
individuals. So, by combining these various approaches a holistic understanding of 
behaviour, viewed through a cultural lens, can be obtained. One that understands the variety 
of social factors that underlie, shapes, and emphasises the different cognitive processes, not 
just within the individual, but within the group, and possibly even society at large.  
Becoming Cultured 
One of the key defining features of culture, as previously mentioned, is that it is 
something shared amongst and between people. If units of knowledge or cultural variants are 
not shared, discussed, passed on between generations then these will die out, cease to exist. 
So the transmission of culture is an absolutely crucial part of its functioning. Similar to the 
Language Acquisition Devices (LAD) once proposed by Noam Chomsky, Konner (2010) 
proposed a type of Cultural Acquisition Device (CAD) possessed by all humans. Different to 
the LAD the CAD is not a distinct cognitive mechanism, but rather a collection of various 
social or habitual learning processes. Konner (2010) identified 17 processes altogether, 
loosely arranged into 4 categories (See Table 2). 
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Table 2. Processes of the Cultural Acquisition Device 
Reactive processes (cultural habitus) 
Habituation 
Classical conditioning 
Associative conditioning 
Instrumental conditioning 
Social facilitation 
Facilitative processes (social learning) 
Local enhancement (ad hoc scaffolding) 
Imitation 
Instruction 
Collaboration 
Psychodynamic processes (emotional enculturation) 
Attachment 
Positive identification (role modeling) 
Fear of strangers (in-group preferencing) 
Negative identification (us-them polarization) 
Emotion management 
Symbolic processes (cognitive enculturation) 
Cultural construction of perception 
Cultural schematization 
Narrative construction 
Cultural coherence 
Note: Adapted from Konner (2010), Table 4.4. 
 
The first set of processes refer to the ways in which individuals learn about their 
environment through the simple fact of being present in that milieu. Through encountering 
certain stimuli or observing the same social rituals frequently over an extended period of 
time, a young child learns a number of social norms by simply being present. For instance, 
welcoming rituals for guests may not need to be taught to a child, they learn it through seeing 
their parents perform the same sequence of actions whenever a guest arrives. 
The second set of processes refer to the ways in which individuals are purposefully 
taught about or actively study their social environment. Through purposefully imitating or by 
receiving purposeful instruction, a young apprentice learns the crafts of their parents or 
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elders. The crux here is the term “purposeful”. It is not passive learning as the previous set, 
but active and participatory learning, where the teacher and the student must understand the 
mindsets of each other in order for coherent and meaningful schooling to occur.  
The third set of processes refer to the role of emotions in guiding learning and social 
enculturation. People do not blindly copy or internalise everything they encounter, but are 
inherently biased towards certain stimuli or sources of information. Biases in social learning 
are quite well documented (Konner, 2010; Moya & Henrich, 2016), and a large part of these 
are due to the psychodynamic processes involved in cultural acquisition. For instance, 
individuals are biologically predisposed towards an inherent fear of strangers, starting at 
around 6-9 months of age. This fear of strangers creates an inherent in-group preference and 
also sets the basis for the negative identification of out-group members, an us-them 
polarisation. Children also from as early as 3 years old also use social cues from others to 
guide actions such as food or beverage selection, and adults have a strong tendency to use 
prestige cues in choosing who to imitate (Moya & Henrich, 2016). 
Lastly, the fourth set of processes refers to how the social realm that groups construct 
around themselves and around new generations intimately structures enculturation and social 
learning. Individuals have an inherent need to construct a coherent and meaningful narrative 
of their lives. These narratives provide a foundation from which the present and past can be 
interpreted and understood, and from which future actions can be planned. Social groups 
share this need for a coherent socio-historical narrative within which to understand its place 
in history and the present. These group level narratives, in turn, help structure the personal 
narratives of those members that form part of the group. These narratives also help create 
cultural coherence as well, through forming bonds between members of the group based on 
shared social histories. These symbolic processes essentially form the cultural atmosphere 
within which individuals are raised and from which they derive the morals, social habits, and 
cognitive schemas. 
 
The acquisition of culture is, as shown by emotional enculturation processes in the 
CAD, greatly biased towards the individual’s in-group (those people perceived as being 
similar to oneself). Newson et al. (2010) also outline a number of other biases that constrain 
the transmission of specific cultural variants. If a specific cultural variant is not deemed to be 
beneficial to the individual, then the likelihood of it being adopted becomes less. For 
instance, if binding your feet does not seem like a useful strategy of obtaining a potential 
mate, then you are very unlikely to adopt such a cultural practice. Individuals also tend to 
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only adopt cultural variants from those people they hold in high esteem and tend to disregard 
those from people they dislike. The more frequently an individual is exposed to particular 
variants, the more likely they are to adopt those variants as well. The actual expression of 
some cultural variants are very often largely dependent on situational or contextual factors as 
well. For instance, certain activities are only deemed appropriate within certain locations or 
times (e.g. drinking alcohol in a church versus a bar); or amongst certain people (e.g. 
drinking alcohol with peers versus elders). Individuals therefore do not blindly adopt all 
cultural variants or practices they are exposed to. They also do not readily and unreservedly 
express cultural variants. The transmission of cultural variants is intimately dependent on the 
actors of culture and contexts within which interactions between people occur. 
 
Another important set of factors that has significantly influenced cultural transmission 
between populations of people was that the spread or acquisition of different cultural ideas, 
concepts, or variants throughout human history greatly depended on space, time, and 
language (Triandis, 2010). Groups needed to be within a close enough geographical distance 
with each other and be present at the same time in order to transmit information between 
them. They also needed to be able to understand one another (e.g. speak the same language) 
in order for meaningful communication to occur. Language also has a strong influence on the 
transmission of cultural variants in that humans across the world tend to draw abstract or 
symbolic boundaries between different groups based on linguistic differences (Moya & 
Henrich, 2016). Consequently, the in-group biases that affect cultural transmission also cause 
transmission to often occur along linguistic divides.  
As anatomically modern humans began spreading out of Africa around 70-60 
thousand years ago the various groups started settling in more and more disparate and 
removed locations from one another (National Geographic Society, 2016). Over time these 
now geographically and ecologically varied groups developed their own unique norms and 
behaviours specifically suited to solving the evolutionary adaptive problems that they faced 
in these unique environments (Konner, 2010; Newson et al., 2010). Different linguistic styles 
also developed as a result of the spatial restrictions in communication between the various 
human groups (Moya & Henrich, 2016). This varied cultural evolution between the different 
human groups resulted in a number of different cultural regions emerging across the globe, 
mainly separated by geographical difference, e.g. Europe and North America, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and East Asia (Triandis, 2010). The exact number of cultural regions remains a matter 
of contention, but the general consensus seems to indicate the existence of between 6 and 10 
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separate regions. The advent and proliferation of writing and more modern advances in 
technology such as the internet have removed the first two limits on cultural transmission, 
and greatly reduced the last. These advances of modernisation and the increasingly globalised 
world of today have provided the individual with access to an unprecedented amount of 
cultural variants (Newson et al., 2010). These advances, however, are relatively recent in 
comparison to the time-scale within which cultural groups evolved and diversified into the 
societies we see today. Furthermore, the various biases that constrain cultural acquisition are 
also still in place. So while individuals may have access to an unprecedented amount of 
differing cultural variants, what they choose to adopt and internalise still has numerous 
constraints placed upon them. Instead of seeing a kind of cultural homogenisation as some 
people believed would happen, we are instead still seeing a great diversity of cultures, with 
new amalgamations and varieties forming out of this great explosion of cultural transmission 
between disparate groups of people (Newson et al., 2010). In this increasingly globalised 
world, the fluid and constantly changing nature of culture has become far more prominent in 
our attempts to understand its effects of psychology. Readily identifiable and boundaried 
cultures are fast becoming obsolete (if such things ever existed) and a polycultural 
perspective on cultures and individuals is becoming more important in trying to study culture 
and the behaviour (Chiu & Kwan, 2016). 
Psychological Universals 
It is important to note at this point that because cultural transmission via social 
learning is a much faster process than genetic transmission, cultural evolution has progressed 
at a much faster rate than biological evolution (Norenzayan et al., 2010). Although the 
relatively fast pace of cultural evolution has ultimately resulted in the seemingly vast 
differences between human cultures seen today, due to the slow nature of biological evolution 
it is still widely agreed upon that some basic or “universal” cognitive toolkit should, in 
principle, still be available to all humans regardless of culture (Konner, 2010; Markus & 
Hamedani, 2010). Culture does not evolve within a biological vacuum, and any cultural trend 
will necessarily have to be supported by the underlying biology. If the biology cannot support 
a certain cognitive tool or process, it cannot evolve or be created. What culture therefore does 
is create new and adapted cognitive tools from this biological or “universal” toolkit. The 
shape, function, or accessibility of these new tools, however, will vary from culture to culture 
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in accordance with their unique histories and the demands it placed on societies, but each will 
still be constrained by the underlying human biology (Markus & Hamedani, 2010).  
It is also important to point out that humans, regardless of culture, are actually far 
more similar than dissimilar. Besides the obvious similarities such as the fact that we are all 
bipedal, have linguistic capabilities, and use tools extensively in daily life, humans share 
numerous other cultural practices (Konner, 2010). For instance, the institution of marriage, 
although found in a variety of forms, is present in all human societies. All societies also share 
taboos again homicide and incest, and also have techniques for healing and caring for the ill. 
One of the better known psychological universal is the recognition and interpretation of 
emotions (Ekman, 2016). All people are able to effectively and efficiently recognise and 
interpret at least 5 basic emotions: anger, happiness, sadness, fear, and disgust (Ekman, 
2016). So while variations in human behaviour as a function of culture do exist, the core of 
human behaviour is still mostly the same across the world. 
From Society to the Individual 
Inclusion or at least acknowledgement of macro-level factors in studying individual 
behaviour has become increasingly important in current psychological research. The focus, 
however, is still mainly on understanding individual behaviour, behaviour located at the 
micro-level. Utilising the approaches described above cultural psychologist have found that a 
specific foundational component of an individual’s psyche is key in mediating the effects of 
culture on cognition, i.e. the conceptualisation or construction of the self. 
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Chapter 2: Culture and the Self 
 
The self is comprised of all the various thoughts, schemas, abstract artefacts, habits, 
and modes of being that represents the individual as a person (Markus & Hamedani, 2010). 
According to Vygotsky (1981) all higher mental functions that humans exhibit or acquire in 
life are inherently social in nature. It is through learning of and experiencing the social world 
that individuals come to create the various cognitive schemas and cultural blueprints that 
guide behaviour (Mkhize, 2004; Vygotsky, 1981). The self, seen as the accumulation of 
psychological experiences and units of knowledge, is therefore an inherently social construct, 
created through the dynamic interactions with the individual’s social environment across his 
or her lifetime (Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2010; Mwamwenda, 2004).  
Due to the various factors influencing cultural transmission and adoption the exact 
nature of this dynamic between the self and the social environment, however, can differ from 
person to person. Each individual chooses their own unique set of cultural variants to 
incorporate into their self, and the variants chosen are greatly dependent on personal 
experience and the various social environments the individual finds themselves in over time. 
If you are never exposed to certain contexts (e.g. visiting a student bar), then you will never 
incorporate certain behaviours or norms into your self-identity (e.g. downing shots on a 
Friday night). A foundational problem in psychology, though, is that the abstract “mind” 
cannot be studied objectively, and so instead we study overt behaviour. It is, however, a well 
substantiated fact that people tend to adjust their behaviour according to their context, a fact 
that has vexed personality researchers for decades (Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2010). 
Behaviour in context 
Understanding the self as a set of cultural blueprints that guides behaviour, also 
allows for an understanding of varied behaviour depending on context. Viewed through a 
cultural lens personality and the self cannot be seen as a stable and concrete system, 
expressed consistently no matter the context. Individuals instead adjust their behaviours 
through if…then… type calculations, that when in situation A, do behaviour X, but when in 
situation B, do behaviour Y (e.g. when in a student bar, down shots, but when at church, sing 
hymns) (Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1994). These if…then… profiles, however, have been 
found to be relatively stable across contexts, in comparison to specific types of behaviour. 
For instance, Shoda et al. (1994) found that in a summer camp context, one child reliably 
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became aggressive when warned or rebuked by adults, whereas in contrast another child 
reliably became aggressive when confronted by peers and not adults. Consequently, it was 
concluded that both children reliably displayed aggression, but only within certain contexts. 
Aggression itself, though, was not consistent across contexts. 
Specific types of behaviour are therefore seen as activated through the context of the 
individual, or rather, through the activation of knowledge of the context. The individual needs 
to understand the context, their behaviour, and the appropriateness of that behaviour within 
that context in order to behave in a certain manner. Mischel and Shoda (1995) proposed a 
framework within which these profiles of if..then… scenarios and their associated patterns of 
knowledge activation can be organised to provide a coherent, holistic, and culturally sensitive 
understanding of personality and behaviour. The Cognitive-Affective Personality System 
(CAPS) framework maintains that behaviour is dependent on various cognitive-affective 
units (CAUs), each activated by different contextual features. The culturally derived 
blueprints for behaviour that make up the self, therefore, consists of an accumulation of 
CAUs. These units of knowledge can also be divided into five separate categories: encodings 
or constructs for the self, other people, situations or events; expectations and beliefs 
regarding behavioural outcomes, how the world works, or self-efficacy; emotional or 
affective responses; goals or outcomes for specific situations or life in general; and 
behavioural schemas or scripts for organising behaviour and shaping outcomes (Mischel & 
Shoda, 1995). Situational features activate a pattern of various CAUs which in turn activates 
specific types of behaviours. Similar to activation patterns in neural networks CAUs are 
either inhibited or excitated by the situational features as well as other CAUs. Specific types 
of behaviour are subsequently produced depending on the pattern of CAUs activated 
(Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2010).  
Culture, however, works on various levels beyond the individual, and so any 
framework that wishes to incorporate holistic cultural sensitivity would also need to look past 
the features of just the immediate situation. The Cultural Cognitive-Affective System (C-
CAPS) is a framework which expands on the CAPS framework to include macro-level 
factors in understanding the context dependent behaviour of individuals (Mendoza-Denton & 
Mischel, 2010). Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the C-CAPS framework. In brief, 
the framework maintains that a person’s subjective and physical culture shapes and constrains 
the CAUs incorporated into or constituting the self (1). Furthermore, the subjective culture 
(especially when shared by collectives) also shapes the physical culture or lived context of 
the individual (2) which in turn deeply shapes the nominal situations experienced by 
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individuals (3). These nominal situations merge with the personal appraisal of that situation 
to create the subjectively experienced features of the situation (4, 5). This then activates 
specific CAUs within the self and consequently the if…then… scenarios which ultimately 
produces context dependent behaviours (6a, 6b, 7). Lastly, behavioural outcomes can then 
alter the person’s immediate environment (8), or even possibly result in a cultural shift or 
change at the macro level (9). 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the Cultural Cognitive-Affective Processing System (C-CAPS). 
Solid lines indicate excitatory links between CAUs while dotted lines indicate inhibitory links 
CAUs. Adapted from Mendoza-Denton and Mischel (2010), Figure 7.3. 
 
To illustrate with an example, through being raised in a religious family and 
community an individual has internalised a number of religious beliefs, rituals, and norms 
into his self-identity that guides his behaviour. This community has also created institutions 
which symbolises their beliefs and provides physical spaces within which to practice and 
share these values and norms. Every Sunday the individual goes to his religious institutions 
where he takes part in a religious sermon. This situation activates the various units of 
knowledge or CAUs related to his religious identity which informs which behaviour is 
appropriate in that context. Thus, when the pastor indicates the time, he picks up his book of 
hymns and joins in with the rest of the congregation in song. This situation, based on the 
physical culture and the subjective culture it symbolises, would not easily activate the 
behavioural response to, for instance, consume an alcoholic beverage (other than on Sunday 
17 
 
mass), since those CAUs are intimately linked with a wholly other nominal situation and 
physical culture (e.g. a student bar). 
Multiculturalism in a diverse world 
In an increasingly globalised world the transmission of cultural variants have gained 
unprecedented reach and pervasiveness (Hong, Zhan, Morris, & Benet-Martinez, 2016; 
Newson et al., 2010). Human migration has increased to such an extent that according to a 
United Nations report from 2002 as many as 185 million people were living outside of the 
country of their birth (Hong, Wan, No, & Chiu, 2010). In 2014 over 1133 million 
international tourists travelled the world, and internet usage had increased from 25 million 
people in 1993 to 2.93 billion in 2014 (Hong et al., 2016). With this rise in culturally diverse 
nations and exposure to different cultures has come increased attention on multicultural 
identities as more and more people are raised and live within far more culturally complex 
environments than in previous eras.  
Due to the various biases and factors influencing transmission and adoption of 
cultural variants, as individuals come into contact with different cultural environments a 
number of different outcomes may occur (Hong et al., 2016). Firstly, the person may 
assimilate into the new more pervasive cultural context wherein they alter their self-identity 
to better fit the greater social context; they can also maintain their original cultural heritage 
while simultaneously developing or integrating with the mainstream culture; they may choose 
to completely reject the mainstream culture and instead maintain a separation between their 
original cultural identity and that of the mainstream; they may also choose to reject both the 
mainstream as well as their original identity leading to cultural marginalisation; and lastly 
individuals may combine aspects of both or numerous cultures into a new hybrid polycultural 
identity 
Integration or polyculturalism is believed to be the most psychologically healthy 
outcomes for the individual, but this results in the individual having to navigate bicultural or 
multicultural identities (Berry, 1997; Hong et al., 2016). The process of assimilation would 
also result in a transitioning multicultural period for the individual as they learn and adopt the 
various units of knowledge from their new cultural milieu. Consequently, these multicultural 
or polycultural individuals will have incorporated a large variety of cultural variants within 
their personal identity, each attuned to differing social and situational features or contexts. 
Appraisal of the features of nominal situations are now affected by CAUs shaped from not 
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only their original cultural heritage, but also those of other bodies of cultural knowledge. 
Interpreting and understanding social situations can now be viewed through more than one 
“cultural lens” and the individual can dynamically alter the way in which such appraisals 
occur. This “cultural frame switching” (Hong et al., 2010, p. 326) is typically pushed by 
specific features of an environment and allows the individual to dynamically navigate the 
more complex social worlds they live in. As will be discussed later on this ability to switch 
between different cultural lenses may have profound effects on various cognitive and 
behavioural processes. 
Our social environment, as previously shown, is intimately informed and shaped by 
the various socio-ecological niches that different groups have found themselves in throughout 
their histories. Consequently, the manner in which the self is created is just as nuanced and 
intricate as culture itself, since the two are so intimately linked. Adding in the existence of 
multicultural identities within a diverse and multicultural environment, covering all the 
various nuances and subtle differences in how the self can be created or expressed across the 
world is well beyond the scope of this paper. One specific factor, however, has grabbed the 
attention of cross-cultural researchers, and is believed to be at the root of most of the cross-
cultural variations in cognition found across the world: the social orientation of the self 
(Kitayama et al., 2010; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; 
Taras et al., 2014; Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010). 
Cultural differences in social orientation 
An individual’s social orientation refers to the manner in which the individual views 
themselves in relation to those around them (e.g. relatives or friends), their broader 
community, and even the cosmos at large (Varnum et al., 2010). It fundamentally structures 
how they see their place in the social world around them, what roles they are expected to 
fulfil, and what behaviour is socially accepted according to this position. The self and the 
social orientation of the self are inseparable as the latter is naturally a fundamental 
component of the individual’s self-identity. The impact of social orientation on behaviour is 
therefore of significant importance as it incorporates a variety of CAUs (encodings, 
expectations and beliefs, self-regulatory scripts etc.) and deeply structures appraisals of 
nominal situations. As the C-CAPS framework shows, the social norms and practices 
espoused by a particular culture intimately shapes or structures an individual’s social 
orientation by proscribing the above mentioned functions of social orientation through its 
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influence on available cultural variants (Varnum et al., 2010). It is thus clear to see why this 
specific aspect of the relationship between the self and culture has garnered so much attention 
from cross-cultural researchers. Different types of self-identities or self-concepts are created 
through the various norms that govern social relations that are incorporated into the self as a 
result of being raised within any given sociocultural context (Kitayama et al., 2010). Decades 
of research on the norms and values espoused by various cultural groups that affects social 
relations has identified two fundamental distinctions: Individualistic and Collectivistic social 
orientations (Hofstede, 1980; Kitayama et al., 2010; Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016). 
Individualistic cultures tend to promote social relations based on instrumental 
relationships of separate individuals, connected through loose ties typically centred around 
specific goals or functions (Kitayama et al., 2010; Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016). Social 
interactions are usually centred on individual participants seeking to attain specific self-
centred goals (Kitayama et al., 2010). Relationships are based on cost-benefit evaluations, 
where the individual must weigh up the benefits in pursuing social interactions versus the 
costs of doing so (Kitayama et al., 2010). Although a cultural norm such as this may seem to 
promote selfishness and reckless self-enhancement, social rejection is still a major threat and 
potential cost to such behaviours. Furthermore, in societies composed of large groups of 
loosely connected individuals, social order is also often maintained through external 
institutions such as national legal systems, which helps maintain and structure a system of 
loose networks (Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016). 
Collectivistic cultures on the other hand tend to promote social relations based on 
mutual reciprocity between individuals with strong ties to each other, often familial based 
(Kitayama et al., 2010; Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016). Social interactions are usually 
centered around communal needs or responsiveness to contextual features (Kitayama et al., 
2010). Mutual help and sharing of resources is an implied assurance for members of these 
close networks, and exclusion is used as punishment for those that do not cooperate in this 
reciprocity (Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016). This inward communal outlook creates a strong 
preference for in-group members and a conversely strong avoidance or exclusion of out-
group members, but can also increase distrust and friction between in-group members as well 
(Kitayama et al., 2010; Yamagishi & Hashimoto, 2016). 
 
The general consensus in the literature is that “Western” cultures (e.g., Germans, 
Canadians, British, etc.) tend to promote more individualistic values or norms regarding 
social interactions, and consequently tend to promote independent self-concepts. Cultures 
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from, essentially, the rest of the world (e.g., Chinese, Russians, Latin Americans, etc.) have 
been found to typically promote more collectivistic values or norms and so tend to promote 
interdependent self-concepts (Kitayama et al., 2010; Norenzayan et al., 2010; Oyserman et 
al., 2002; Varnum et al., 2010).  
Independent self-concepts typically refer to a sense of self wherein the individual 
perceives their selfhood as being quite distinct from those around them. They see themselves 
as autonomous beings, separate from those around them and their environment or context. 
The self is essentially a ‘given’, something concrete and stable at the core of who they are 
and what their role in the world is, unaffected by context (Oyserman et al., 2002; Valchev, 
2012). Their personal agency is of utmost importance in determining this role or place in the 
world and personal achievement and self-sufficiency are usually greatly valued (Mkhize, 
2004; Oyserman et al., 2002). 
An interdependent self-concept refers to a sense of self wherein the individual’s 
context or social environment plays a key role in determining their selfhood (Mkhize, 2004; 
Oyserman et al., 2002). The self is not a fixed construct but is inextricably linked to the social 
environment and those around them. The individual sees themselves as a creation of their 
relations with their context and social environment. Selfhood is therefore intimately 
dependent on this context and its interactions with it, changing as needed. Personal agency is 
often supressed in lieu of the collective will with greater value placed on social harmony and 
balance (Mkhize, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002; Varnum et al., 2010).  
So if, for instance, you are raised within a community that promotes personal agency 
and individual self-promotion, you are more likely to incorporate these values within your 
self-identity and thus create an independent self-concept. In contrast if your community 
espouses self-effacing and communal responsibility, these values are more likely to form part 
of your self-identity and thus create an interdependent self-concept.  
The antecedents of self-concept differences 
So how did these often contrasting differences in norms regarding social relations 
come about across the world? Why do certain societies or groups promote an interdependent 
self over an independent self (or vice versa)? While the exact and comprehensive list of 
factors responsible is still under debate, a number of potential antecedents have been 
identified (Mkhize, 2004; Norenzayan et al., 2010; Oyserman et al., 2002; Varnum et al., 
2010).  
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The philosophical or religious traditions of a group of people is believed to play a key 
role in structuring the role of the individual in relation to other people, society, and even the 
cosmos at large (Kitayama et al., 2010; Mkhize, 2004). Religion intimately proscribes 
appropriate and acceptable behaviours, and it shapes understandings of social relations on 
various levels (Kiernan, 1995). It’s immense role in shaping social norms and values 
throughout history is undeniable, and functions as the bedrock of understanding reality for the 
majority of people in the world (Hackett, Grim, Stonawski, & Abel, 2012; Kiernan, 1995; 
Norenzayan et al., 2016). 
The philosophical traditions of most Western nations have strong Greek Aristotelian 
roots, but with Protestantism and the numerous writings of the European Reformation and 
Renaissance periods also having a strong shaping influence as well (Kitayama et al., 2010; 
Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009). These philosophical traditions placed 
personal agency and control of one’s fate firmly within the hands of the individual. They 
endorsed the idea that the nature of the cosmos could be fully understood through systematic 
categorisation by mapping the discreet boundaries between various objects. The individual is 
seen as a concrete object, separate from context, the agent of their own destinies. 
Most East Asian nations or cultures are deeply embedded within Confucianist, 
Buddhist, Taoist or Bushido schools of thought (Kitayama et al., 2010). Within these 
traditions the individual is always placed in relation to others, the prevailing social structure 
or hierarchy, and the cosmos at large. The maintenance of harmony and balance is strongly 
emphasised, and it is the duty of the individual to preserve this through special care of the 
relationships they embody. The cosmos is understood as matrices of complex relationships, 
and can only be understood as such, i.e. in relation to other objects/forces. 
 African philosophical traditions follow a similar vein as East Asian traditions, in that 
the individual is also usually described in relational terms (Laher, 2013; Mkhize, 2004; 
Mwamwenda, 2004; Valchev, 2012). The self is not a boundaried discrete construct but 
intimately connected with other people, their ancestors, God, and even the cosmos at large. 
(Meyer, Moore, & Viljoen, 2008; Mwamwenda, 2004). A person is only a person in relation 
to other people, and the self is always in a constant state of change throughout the lifetime. 
As the individual’s context changes, so does the self since they are essentially one and the 
same. African traditional religions also emphasise social cohesion and harmony, self-
effacement, and responsiveness to perceptions of others (Kiernan, 1995). 
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The type of economic or agricultural activity a community is built on is also believed 
to strongly influence how the self is constructed (Cohen & Varnum, 2016; Kitayama et al., 
2010; Varnum et al., 2010). For instance, groups involved in more sedentary agricultural 
activities such as fishing or farming tend to be more interdependent than groups of a more 
nomadic nature such as herders or hunter-gatherers. Industrialised societies are also believed 
to promote a more independent sense of self than more agriculturally based societies. 
Industrialisation and formal schooling pushes commerce and reliance on individual abstract 
thinking versus the interdependent reasoning required by agricultural work (Greenfield, 
2016). The larger urban environments that grow as a result of these changes in national 
industry also emphasise isolated living and more nuclear families as opposed to the 
intergenerational households typical of rural communities (Greenfield, 2016). These 
sociodemographic changes consequently alter the values and norms upheld by these societies, 
moving away from resource driven values towards more self-centred values since in poor 
communities there is a greater need for sharing resources than in wealthy communities or 
societies (Fischer & Boer, 2016; Greenfield, 2016). Consequently, self-expression and 
personal growth is valued more over communal responsibility and resource reciprocity in 
these economically developed societies. 
 
Lastly, a very prominent factor believed to play a strong role in developing a society 
that promotes an independent sense of self is migration or voluntary settlement in foreign 
lands (Cohen & Varnum, 2016; Kitayama et al., 2010; Varnum et al., 2010). It is theorised 
that the types of groups more prone to uprooting and moving to new lands are more likely to 
value personal agency and place greater emphasis on personal achievement and success. 
These individuals are also less likely to place great value on broader communal ties and the 
collective will. Societies built on such groups are therefore much more likely to uphold or 
maintain this emphasis on independence as opposed to interdependence for future 
generations.  Furthermore, these societies are probably more likely to be composed of 
separate groups loosely bound together by common goals (e.g. frontier settlement) rather than 
inherent communal ties (e.g. familial bonds). These factors, combined with the Western 
European philosophical traditions and the relative wealth of these countries may be the main 
reasons for the strong emphasis on individualism found within North American cultures, and 
why the USA is often seen as the ‘gold standard’ for individualism (Kitayama et al., 2010; 
Varnum et al., 2010). 
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Caveats in understanding the self and culture 
Although a large and growing body of research has consistently found international 
differences in values and norms regarding social relations, a number of caveats must be 
mentioned in understanding the true relationship between culture and the self.  
 
Once again, it is important to keep in mind the variability in how individuals choose 
specific cultural variants for incorporation. It is also important to keep in mind that observed 
behaviour is a function of the individual’s if…then… profiles within their behavioural 
repertoire. Social context also still has a significant impact on the expression or activation of 
the different social orientations as well (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Specific situational and 
contextual factors may predispose individuals towards exhibiting either an independent or an 
interdependent self-concept, regardless of the usual preference for one or the other 
(Oyserman & Lee, 2008). For example, it has consistently been found that an independent 
self-concept can be activated through asking people to think of and describe themselves as an 
individual, separate from their family or friends. Conversely, an interdependent self-concept 
can be activated by asking people to think and describe themselves as part of a group. The 
exact nature of the relationship between individualism and collectivism is also still under 
much debate, something that will be covered in more detail later on. For instance, an 
individual might be very independent when engaging in business transactions, but quite 
interdependent dealing with family or friends.  
For now, it will suffice to say that the preference for one type of self-construal is not a 
simple either/or situation, but more likely a case of varying degrees, either within a single 
continuum or along multiple dimensions (Oyserman et al., 2002; Taras et al., 2014). In 
everyday life, however, the various nominal situations individuals would typically encounter 
should generally prime them towards a certain type of self-concept due to the overarching 
influence of the broader social norms espoused by their sociocultural milieu (Markus & 
Hamedani, 2010; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). Therefore, in order for a different self-concept to 
be primed, an extraordinary event or task will first have to be encountered, but due to the 
rather stable nature of most social or cultural contexts an individual’s sense of self should 
remain reasonably constant, barring any sudden drastic changes in his or her life. 
 
Individuals also do not act out every single behaviour proscribed by his or her culture 
or social context either. Instead, they tend to choose those most in-line with their personal 
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histories and experiences that still allows them to adhere to their culture’s generally 
sanctioned norms, e.g. independence or interdependence (Kitayama et al., 2009). Figure 2 
shows the cultural task analysis framework proposed by Kitayama et al. (2009) in an attempt 
to explain the observed within-culture heterogeneity of how the self is created and expressed. 
 
 
While the types of ‘traits’ available for incorporation into the self are structured by the 
individual’s socio-cultural context, they may not choose to incorporate the exact same 
repertoire of traits as their neighbour. Therefore, it is very likely that while two individuals 
both construct their sense of self in terms of personal needs (i.e. individualistic), one may 
place greater emphasis on them developing their individual uniqueness while the other may 
place greater value on intently pursuing their personal goals (Kitayama et al., 2009). So while 
aggregated differences might exist between two societies, there might at times be 
considerable variation between individuals believed to be from the same socio-cultural 
background. This is one of the reasons why it is important to keep in mind that what is often 
found at the cultural group level, may not always replicate perfectly on the individual level, 
even in supposedly “monocultural” countries.  
 
Figure 2. Task Analysis Framework (reproduced from Kitayama et al., 2009). 
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Lastly, when speaking about culture at national levels it is also important to note the 
distinction between ‘society’ and ‘culture’, whereas the former refers to a group of people 
who happen to live within close geographical proximity to one another, the latter refers to a 
group of people who share a similar way of living or social worldview (Baldwin et al., 2006). 
While most studies in cultural psychology tend to equate certain cultural traits with a single 
nation state, e.g. Americans are individualistic and Japanese are collectivistic, this becomes 
quite problematic in our increasingly globalised world where most countries are inhabited by 
various groups with cultural heritages from at times vastly different parts of the world, e.g. 
the Nguni and Sotho-Tswana African heritages, and Germanic European heritages found 
within South Africa (Valchev, 2012). It becomes somewhat impossible to refer to a ‘South 
African culture’ in terms of its promotion of an interdependent or independent sense of self as 
the antecedents of these heritages often promote markedly different norms and values 
regarding social relations. 
Measuring Individualism and Collectivism 
Probably the most influential study in cross-cultural comparisons is that of Geert 
Hofstede (1980), in his seminal book Culture’s Consequence. Hofstede compared a large 
number of different societies from all across the world in terms of a number of variables, 
such as ‘power distance’, ‘masculinity’, ‘uncertainty avoidance’, and ‘individualism’. He 
attempted to provide a better understanding of exactly how cultures from various parts of the 
world differ from each other, but also to create a unified framework within which one can 
measure and compare such differences. This was done by administering a survey to large 
groups of individuals from the various countries and then creating an aggregate score meant 
to reflect the general level of, for instance, individualism within that society. By doing so 
Hofstede was able to conclude, for instance, that Americans were much more individualistic 
than say Japanese. Out of all the variables included in his initial study, none has had a greater 
impact than the distinction between individualism (IND) and collectivism (COL). A large 
recent meta-analysis of studies influenced or making use of Hofstede’s framework found that 
almost 88% of the effects of cultural values on organisational behaviour was due to 
differences in IND-COL (Taras et al., 2014). 
Measuring IND-COL is clearly an incredibly useful dimension by which to start 
gaining a better understanding of human behaviour within its social context, but the 
measurement of IND-COL is still, after decades of research, quite a controversial topic 
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(Oyserman et al., 2002; Taras et al., 2014). In the case of Hofstede’s work, the practice of 
assuming national culture is reflected at the individual level is, as previously explained, quite 
problematic. While there are still a number of studies that do make comparisons at the macro 
level, most studies on cross-cultural differences usually focus on differences at the individual 
level (Oyserman et al., 2002; Taras et al., 2014). The measurement of individual differences 
in terms of IND-COL, however, has not been standardised, with a lack of consensus on 
exactly how it should be measured (Oyserman et al., 2002; Taras et al., 2014). As of 2013, 
Vas Taras had identified a list of 157 different instruments that try to measure various aspects 
of culture, a large amount of which do so in terms of IND-COL dimensions. At the time the 
current study was conducted no clear favourite or generally accepted standard for measuring 
IND-COL could, however, be found.  
In a meta-analysis of the various measures of IND-COL in use 20 years prior to their 
study Oyserman et al. (2002) did find a general consensus on how individualism and 
collectivism is conceptualised separately, generally following the descriptions regarding 
independent and interdependent self-concepts provided previously. Little consensus, 
however, was found as to whether IND-COL were bipolar opposites on a single continuum or 
orthogonal constructs altogether. A recent meta-analysis by Taras et al. (2014) also found a 
similar lack of consensus as to the dimensionality of the IND-COL relationship, and even 
found some evidence to suggest that dimensionality might change depending on geographical 
region or even demographics of the sample studied. Unidimensional conceptualisations view 
IND and COL as polar opposites of one another, and measures typically produce a single 
score that indicate a high or low level of either IND or COL. A high level indicates a strong 
preference for those values or social relational norms, e.g. a person who obtains a high score 
for IND displays a strong preference for personal agency, self-enhancement, or self-
uniqueness. An individual that scores high on a unidimensional IND scale would also 
automatically be assumed to be low on COL, e.g. a meagre preference for self-effacement, 
communal responsibility, or conformity. Bidimensional conceptualisations on the other hand, 
view IND and COL as wholly separate constructs altogether. Individuals would typically 
obtain a score on IND as well as a score on COL, and may have whichever combination of 
scores across the two (e.g. high IND, low COL; high IND, high COL etc.). Certain measures 
go further and also draw distinctions within IND and COL as well, such as between Vertical 
and Horizontal dimensions, or between Family and Co-worker dimensions within both IND 
and COL (Oyserman et al., 2002; Taras et al., 2014).  
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One of the more commonly used measures is that of Singelis (1994) which 
conceptualises IND-COL as a bidimensional relationship, with IND and COL as orthogonal 
constructs (Kitayama et al., 2009; Oyserman et al., 2002; Taras et al., 2014). This 
conceptualisation of the IND-COL relationship was further refined by Singelis, Triandis, 
Bhawuk, and Gelfand (1995) to include the Horizontal and Vertical distinctions within both 
IND and COL. A Horizontal Collectivistic (HC) self-construal emphasises the interdependent 
nature of the self, but also the equal nature of the self in relation to those around it, the 
individual is located within a community of equals. A Vertical Collectivistic (VC) self-
construal also emphasises the interdependent nature of the self, but recognises certain 
inequalities between individuals within a group or community. Similarly, a Horizontal 
Individualistic (HI) self-construal emphasises the independent nature of the self, but also the 
equal nature of the self in relation to those around it, the individual is located within a 
community of equals. A Vertical Individualistic (VI) self-construal emphasises the 
independent nature of the self, but recognises certain inequalities between individuals within 
a group or community. 
With the situational or contextual variations in behaviour and self-concept, narrow 
conceptualisations of IND-COL seem ill-suited to accurately capturing the nature of such a 
crucial factor in our understanding of culture and behaviour. Most studies on IND-COL 
though seem to use a unidimensional conceptualisation, although at times only implicitly 
through use of polarising descriptions of the two constructs (Taras et al., 2014). The inclusion 
of further refined subscales such as the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and 
Collectivism (HVIC) scales are also quite limited in the literature, which is unsurprising 
given the lack of consensus regarding the dimensionality of IND-COL itself. This general 
lack of consensus and confusion as to how to go about measuring such a crucial factor like 
IND-COL creates a problem when attempting to study IND and COL within new populations 
where little to no research has been conducted, especially in countries that lack emic IND-
COL instruments.  
 
The ability to link differences in behaviour, such as performance on perceptual tasks, 
with differences in culture become dubious if the cultural factors in question cannot be 
accurately measured. Most cross-cultural studies on the effect of IND-COL on behaviour 
make use of the implicit belief that the population of nation A generally exhibit self-concept 
X, while the population of nation B generally exhibit self-concept Y. Therefore, by 
comparing a sample from nation A to a sample from nation B on any given cognitive task, we 
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can reasonably assume the effects are due to differences in self-concept. However, this 
implicit belief is based on previous research that obtained aggregated scores for nation A and 
B on one or other IND-COL instrument. With the large variety of measures available and in 
use and no clear favourite either, plus the lack of consensus on something as crucial as 
dimensionality, how accurate or comparable are these cross-national results? The history of 
IND-COL assessment in South Africa provides a quite clear picture of this problem, where 
the ambiguity inherent in culture and how it relates to behaviour and the self can create 
numerous issues in attempting to quantitatively assess IND-COL preferences on a national or 
even individual level. 
Selfhood in South Africa 
To simply say South Africa is a multicultural nation might be somewhat of an 
understatement. With 11 official languages from various ethnic groups with ancestry from 
different continents, the cultural variety found within this country is quite large (Statistics 
South Africa, 2011; Valchev, 2012). 
The Whorfian hypothesis posits the idea that language and cognition are inherently 
linked, and that the former fundamentally structures the latter (Chiu, Leung, & Kwan, 2010). 
While most cognitive and cultural psychologists have moved on from the strict Whorfian 
stance, the intricate relationship between language, culture, and cognition is still widely 
recognised as a significant moderator of behaviour (Chiu et al., 2010; Imai, Kanero, & 
Masuda, 2016). As previously discussed, language often acts as an abstract and subjective 
boundary marker between cultural groups for individuals, but also acts has a mediator for 
cultural transmission between groups, consequently reifying such abstract boundaries. 
Following off of this understanding of the intimate link between culture and language 
as a starting point (Chiu et al., 2010), three broad cultural groups can be defined within South 
Africa: the Nguni; the Sotho-Tswana; and the Germanic (Valchev, 2012). The Nguni and the 
Sotho-Tswana are comprised of the various tribes which migrated down from more Northern 
parts of Africa and settled in South Africa starting from the north east and moving down and 
westward into what is now the Eastern Cape Province (Huffman, 2010). The Germanic 
groups came from the colonial expansion into South Africa which started in 1652 with the 
establishment of a Dutch colony in what is now Cape Town (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2015). Later influxes of German and French settlers mixed with the Dutch settlers to create 
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the Afrikaner nation and the Afrikaans language, whereas the British occupation in the 1800s 
introduced English and the British heritage to South Africa (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015). 
The philosophical traditions of these groups differed quite significantly, with the 
Germanic groups sharing Western Protestant based religious and philosophical beliefs, and 
the Nguni and Sotho-Tswana sharing traditional African religious and philosophical beliefs 
(de Gruchy, 1995; Kiernan, 1995). As previously noted, these traditions promoted markedly 
different norms and values regarding social relations and the place of the self in relation to 
the cosmos. The Germanic “Western” traditions typically promoted individualistic values, 
whereas the traditional African traditions typically promoted collectivistic values. 
Furthermore, the migrant nature of the Germanic groups most likely further reinforced the 
existing individualistic values as well. 
 
The policies of racial segregation instituted during South Africa’s colonial history and 
reinforced during Apartheid meant little to no acculturation or assimilation occurred between 
the African and Germanic ethnic groups throughout South Africa’s history (Seekings, 2008). 
After the abolishment of Apartheid in the 1990’s and the birth of the “Rainbow Nation” in 
1994, new policies of racial desegregation and institutional transformation were put in place 
in a national effort to create a new unified yet culturally diverse country (Hong et al., 2010; 
Seekings, 2008). Over two decades later, however, racial segregation is still quite prevalent 
across the country, although issues of class have started to play a stronger role in maintaining 
this racial segregation (Bhana, 2014; Binikos & Rugunanan, 2015). Research on the cultural 
melting pots of universities have provided interesting insights into how the previously 
institutionally segregated groups have started to interact and integrate (Bhana, 2014; Binikos 
& Rugunanan, 2015). While informal racial segregation is still present, attitudes towards 
racial integration tend to be very liberal and welcoming, although actual integrative 
behaviour still seem to be lagging behind. The most noticeable divisions are also believed to 
mainly be due to class or socioeconomic differences, rather than racial differences in itself, 
but as the middle class of the previously disadvantaged groups grow, this barrier to 
integration may start disappearing as well (Seekings, 2008). 
 
Although integration and consequently cultural assimilation or acculturation may be 
increasing, research on self-concept in South Africa still seem to reflect the racially 
segregated past. Eaton and Louw (2000) found that Xhosa-speaking South Africans were 
more likely to describe themselves in reference to a social group that they identified with than 
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English-speaking South Africans were, indicating that Xhosa-speaking South Africans tended 
to have a more interdependent sense of self than English-speaking South Africans.  
As part of a large scale project to create an emic personality measure, the South 
African Personality Inventory (SAPI), a number of studies were conducted to obtain 
personality descriptions from all linguistic groups in South Africa, create the SAPI scales, 
and obtain validation for the final inventory (Fetvadjiev, Meiring, van de Vijver, Nel, & Hill; 
Valchev, 2012). To identify ethnic groups in South Africa linguistic categories were used, 
initially divided into Bantu languages (isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sesotho sa Leboa, 
Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, and Xitsonga), and Germanic languages (English and 
Afrikaans). The Germanic language category was further refined due to Apartheid legacy of 
racial segregation into White, Coloured, and Indian. Bantu languages were also equated to 
Black as it was concluded that only native Africans would speak any of those as their home 
language. Self and personality-descriptions were obtained from individuals across all 11 
languages and subjected to semantic cluster analysis and later quantitative hierarchical cluster 
analysis. Results revealed 9 broad clusters emerging from the free descriptions, namely 
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, Extraversion, Facilitating, Integrity, Intellect, 
Openness, Relationship Harmony, and Soft-Heartedness. According to Valchev (2012) 
Facilitating, Integrity, Relationship Harmony, and Soft-Heartedness represented distinctly 
social-relational aspects, i.e. relating to interpersonal relationships or social contexts. Using 
the SAPI qualitative database Adams, Vijver, and Bruin (2012) drew out data to analyse 
differences in descriptions between the different ethnic groups. Similar to Eaton and Louw 
(2000) they found that Black South Africans were more likely to describe themselves in 
terms of social relationships than White South Africans.  
Quantitative exploration of the social-relational scales of the SAPI provided further 
evidence for cross-ethnic differences in social-relational aspects of personality (Valchev et 
al., 2014). Factor analysis of the social-relational scales revealed that the various facets 
distinctly loaded onto two factors, dividing the facets in Positive or Negative valence, e.g. 
Integrity and Relationship Harmony loaded onto one factor, while Arrogance and Harmony 
Breach loaded onto the other. Analyses were only conducted for Black and White groups as 
Coloured and Indian groups were deemed too small for inclusion. The scales had adequate 
internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha values ranging from .59 to .92 for Black South 
Africans and .74 to .89 for White South Africans. Multivariate analysis of covariance to test 
for interactions between ethnicity, age, and gender for significant effects for all facets with 
the exception of Empathy, with an overall substantial effect size (𝜂2=.18). Black South 
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Africans tended to score higher on the positive facets while White South Africans scored 
higher on the negative facets (Valchev et al., 2014).  
Although the SAPI social-relational scales are closely linked with IND-COL, they do 
not directly measure these factors, and the two types of valence groupings cannot be equated 
to IND-COL (V. H. Fetvadjiev, personal communication, June 24, 2016). It is most likely 
that the values espoused by IND or COL cultures have a significant impact on personality, 
but as mentioned previously, many other factors also play a part; too many to discuss in full 
here. Consequently, a natural overlap in social-relational scales in personality measurement 
and IND-COL dimensions should be expected, but the one is not fully equal to the other. For 
instance, facets such as Integrity (e.g. ‘‘I acknowledge my mistakes’’ (Valchev et al., 2014, p. 
19) or Hostility (e.g. “I make people feel vulnerable” (Valchev et al., 2014, p. 19) do not 
necessarily equate IND or COL values, but IND or COL values may allow for such 
behaviours to be expressed more readily. 
Qualitatively it would therefore seem that social-relational facets form part of the 
South African personality profile, and that significant differences in terms of IND-COL 
related facets do exists along racial or linguistic lines within the South African context. These 
facets, however, or not equal to IND-COL, and as of yet no emic instrument for measuring 
IND-COL in South Africa exists. Consequently, research directly studying IND-COL in 
South Africa has relied on internationally created instruments applied within the South 
African context. 
 
The first major foray into studying IND-COL in South Africa was Hofstede’s (1980) 
study that really began all the fascination with IND-COL, as it also included a South African 
sample in its data. His study found that South Africa as a nation tended to be quite 
individualistic, but this was most likely a very poor representation of the South African 
population at large. The study was conducted only with IBM personnel, and took place over 2 
decades prior to the end of Apartheid. Consequently, only White South Africans were 
sampled, which is not representative of the greater South African population at all. This lack 
of racial inclusion was mentioned in later works by Hofstede, but no new research was done 
to include a more diverse sample into the analyses (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). 
Furthermore, as mentioned previously the issue of reducing national culture to the individual 
level is problematic in most nations, but probably far more problematic in a multicultural 
nation such as South Africa.  
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Thomas and Bendixen (2000) made use of the VSM94, a survey created from the 
Hofstede (1980) study, to assess management styles of white and black South Africans. They 
found high levels of individualism, higher in fact than Hofstede’s original study (average of 
81 vs 65; unidimensional IND scale with a maximum of 100) for the SA managers. This high 
level of IND was found across race and gender groups (above 70 for all groups). 
In another study on the management styles of black and white South Africans 
Booysen (2001) made use of the Project-GLOBE leadership and culture questionnaire that 
included a unidimensional IND-COL scale. They found a significant difference between 
black and white South Africans with the former being more collectivistic and the latter more 
individualistic. These quantitative results were also supported by a qualitative exploration of 
management styles which found distinctly collectivistic themes for black South Africans and 
individualistic themes for white South Africans (e.g. belief in group decisions and incentives 
vs individual decisions and incentives). 
van Dyk and de Kock (2004) looked into how differences in IND-COL could affect 
behaviour among military personnel in SA. They administered the Individualism-
Collectivism Interpersonal Assessment Inventory (ICIAI) by Matsumoto, Weissman, Preston, 
Brown, and Kupperbusch (1997) to a sample of officer-students at the South African Military 
Academy. In contrast to Valchev et al. (2013) they did not find any significant differences 
between Black, Coloured, and White racial groups in IND-COL. Although the ICIAI did 
have a high internal consistency (α > .7), it did not replicate the factor loadings as reported 
previously for the scale, pointing to possible validity issues within the South African context 
for that scale. 
In another study Vogt and Laher (2009) attempted to see if there was a relationship 
between the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality and IND-COL within the South African 
context. They also wanted to know whether scores would differ according to race as well. 
They administered the IND-COL scale by Hui (1988) to a South African sample and, same as 
van Dyk and de Kock (2004), no significant differences were found as a function of race, nor 
was there a significant relationship between the FFM and IND-COL. The scale also had an 
internal consistency coefficient of .73 overall scale, but they did not report statistics for the 
subscales, nor any other correlational or validity data. 
The studies by van Dyk and de Kock (2004) and Vogt and Laher (2009), however, 
suffered from significant limitations such as unsubstantiated IND-COL measurement validity 
within the African context, collapsing of potentially differing cultural groups into one, as well 
as arguably small sample sizes (N = 88 and N = 176 respectively). All of the measures used 
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in these studies also used a unidimensional conceptualisation of IND-COL, although 
situational variations in IND-COL were incorporated by the last two, e.g. IND-COL within 
the contexts of family, work, friends etc. (Hui, 1988; Matsumoto et al., 1997). 
The only other study that administered an IND-COL scale to South Africans was that 
of Györkös et al. (2012), where they used the shortened version of the Singelis et al. (1995) 
HVIC scale developed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998). They found that all four of the 
subscales as well as the overall IND and COL scales had adequate reliability (α > .7). A 
confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the four factor model replicated well within the 
South African context as well. Furthermore, a weak positive correlation (r = .27) between the 
general IND-COL scales also indicated support for the bidimensional conceptualisation of the 
IND-COL relationship. Unfortunately, though having the best psychometric results as well as 
a much larger sample (N=818), they did not do any cross racial comparisons, nor did they 
report the levels of IND-COL, since the sole purpose of the study was only to evaluate the 
psychometric properties of the HVIC scale.  
 
There seems to be then a contradiction in the South Africa literature as to how self-
concept differs between the various groups in South Africa. While open ended self-
descriptions reveal a marked difference along racial or linguistic lines, psychometric 
measurements have thus far found conflicting results. Furthermore, emic personality scales 
with strong conceptual ties to IND-COL also revealed significant differences along racial or 
linguistic lines as well. In light of the previously discussed issues regarding the psychometric 
assessment of IND-COL this contradiction could quite likely be the result of the specific 
measures used failing to capture the way IND-COL is expressed within the South African 
context. It may also, however, be due to the methodological issues present in the studies they 
were used in. What the actual cause of this discrepancy is, is unclear. What is clear though, is 
that IND-COL assessment in South Africa requires a lot more attention. 
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Chapter 3: Culture, Self, and Cognition 
 
The cognitive effects of cross-cultural differences in self-concept have been one of the 
most intensively studied topics in cultural psychology over the last few decades (Cole & 
Scribner, 1974; Norenzayan et al., 2010; Varnum et al., 2010). In understanding human 
behaviour, the self can be seen as a basis from which the individual organises behaviour and 
creates meaning from his or her experiences and interaction with the world (Kitayama et al., 
2010; Mkhize, 2004). It can therefore also be seen as a large contributor or shaper of the 
cognitive toolkit an individual has access to. The way in which the self is shaped has a 
significant impact on how the individual creates his or her unique cognitive toolkit from the 
“universal” biological toolkit. Recent studies in cultural neuroscience have even found that 
differences in self-concept modulates brain activity as well, and creates a “cultural 
framework for the neural substrates of cognitive and affective processes” (Han & 
Humphreys, 2016, p. 10). The self, therefore, fundamentally structures the way in which the 
individual thinks, right down to the most basic processes of the mind and brain (Kitayama et 
al., 2010; Markus & Hamedani, 2010; Norenzayan et al., 2010).  
Independent self-concepts are characterised by an emphasis on unique and stable 
characteristics of the self and the social context, while an interdependent self-concept places 
greater value on the relationships within the social context. This difference in emphasis on 
unique characteristics versus contextual characteristics is believed to create marked 
differences in cognitive styles (Ji & Yap, 2016; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Miyamoto, 2013; 
Norenzayan et al., 2010). An independent self-concept is believed to foster analytic (ANA) 
thinking due to its emphasis on the discrete or boundaried nature of the self and the world 
around it (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Norenzayan et al., 2010). Objects are perceived as 
solitary and context free, purposefully removed from its surrounds. The specific 
characteristics of the singular object are emphasised in understanding it while contextual 
features are minimised. Objects are also understood in reference to the specific categories that 
they are placed in through the use of formal logic and decontextualisation. An interdependent 
self-concept is believed to foster holistic (HOL) thinking due to its emphasis of relationship 
and contextual features in understanding the world and one’s place in it (Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001; Norenzayan et al., 2010). The world is understood in terms of its context or the 
relationships between the various objects that the world is comprised of (Norenzayan et al., 
2010). Objects in a person’s environment are not understood in isolation, but rather perceived 
as part of a greater whole, interconnected and inherently part of their surroundings.  
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While all people have access to both these tools (Analytic vs holistic thinking) in their 
kits, the choice to choose one over the other is dependent on a person’s cultural background 
and context through the priming of specific self-concepts. An interdependent self-concept 
encourages the use of a more holistic tool with which to engage the environment, while an 
independent self-concept encourages a more analytic tool to be used.  
Linking culture with cognition: IND-COL & ANA-HOL 
According to the C-CAPS framework for understanding culturally situated behaviour, 
any given group of people’s sociocultural history shapes their present cultural milieu. These 
distal factors within the cultural milieu in turn shape more proximal factors such as social 
institutions and social norms and values. These values are in turn internalised within the 
individual through incorporation of cultural variants into the self. The social institutions on 
the other hand, shape the nominal situations that the culturally shaped self interacts with, and 
consequently produce context dependent behaviour.  
IND and COL can be seen as the distal level factors that ultimately produce the 
individual level behaviour or cognition of ANA or HOL thinking. The IND-COL milieus 
create different types of social structures, cultural products, communication styles, and social 
norms or values (Miyamoto, 2013). It is to these proximal level factors that individuals attune 
their cognitive processes for optimal functioning within their specific contexts. Continuous 
and prolonged exposure to these proximal contexts create habitual ways of thinking, 
developing specific cognitive patterns and specific neural patterns of activation (or vice 
versa), e.g. ANA-HOL patterns of thinking. Figure 3 provides a framework for the various 
levels and links between the broader cultural milieu and individual level cognition. This 
multilevel analysis of ANA-HOL cognition links well with the general understanding of 
culturally situated behaviour provided through the C-CAPS framework, where distal level 
factors have to be taken into account when attempting to understand individual level 
behaviour. 
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Figure 3. Framework for Individualism-Collectivism & Analytic-Holistic relationship 
(reproduced from Miyamoto, 2013) 
 
The self and visual attention 
These two different styles of thinking, and most likely the subsequent neural 
modulation, have been found to affect various cognitive processes, such as attention, 
memory, categorisation, or causal attribution (Ji & Yap, 2016; Norenzayan et al., 2010). 
Once again, detailing the effects of analytic versus holistic thinking for all these various 
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cognitive processes is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, specific attention will be given 
to what is arguably one of the most fundamental cognitive processes, namely, attention. 
 
Directing visual attention towards important environmental features or cues is an  
evolutionary adaptive function, available to all humans through our shared biologically based 
toolkit (Masuda, Ishii, & Kimura, 2016) (Norenzayan et al., 2010). The brain, however, is 
created through evolution to process information quickly and economically, meaning 
attention is only directed at the most important information in our environment in order to 
efficiently process the enormous volume of information our senses constantly take in (Krill, 
Platek, Goetz, & Shackelford, 2007). Attention is generally controlled through two broad 
mechanisms: bottom-up attentional selection and top-down attentional selection (Banich & 
Compton, 2011; Masuda et al., 2016). The former refers to when attention is automatically 
drawn to specific features of the environment, usually due to evolutionarily salient features, 
e.g. a dangerous animal, food sources, or potential mates. The latter, on the other hand, refers 
to when the individual directs his or her attention, usually based on specific goals or 
behaviourally relevant stimuli (Banich & Compton, 2011; Masuda et al., 2016).  
In the absence of evolutionarily salient features, top-down processing typically plays a 
significant role in determining how attention is directed. Top-down processes, however, are 
shaped by the goals of the individual and his or her subjective appraisal of the situation, 
which according to the C-CAPS framework is intimately shaped by culture. Moreover, 
priming of independent or interdependent self-concepts modulates brain activity to be ready 
for either self-focusing or context-focusing attention, even when at rest (Han & Humphreys, 
2016). So although directed attention is a tool from our universal toolkit, the way in which it 
gets used, consciously or subconsciously, is greatly influenced by cultural factors (Han & 
Humphreys, 2016; Masuda et al., 2016). 
 
To illustrate how culture can affect attention Masuda and Nisbett (2001) tested the 
difference in holistic versus analytic perceptual styles by asking American and Japanese 
students to describe what they saw in various animated underwater scenes. They found that 
Americans were more likely to emphasize focal features of the scenes such as large or fast 
moving objects, while Japanese were 60% more likely to describe more background features 
than the Americans. Furthermore, changes in background information were more likely to 
impact Japanese students’ ability to accurately judge whether or not an object had previously 
been seen than it did on American students’ ability. In a later study, Masuda and Nisbett 
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(2006) tested change blindness between Americans and East Asians by showing a series of 
still pictures as well as animated scenes that included various focal objects upon a complex 
background. During the sequence of pictures or the animation some background and focal 
features were altered and participants were asked to identify any changes. In line with the 
previous study, Americans were more likely to identify more changes in focal features, while 
East Asians were more likely to identify more changes to background features.  
These differences in perception are not only limited to passive visual attention and 
change blindness. Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, and Larsen (2003) made use of the framed-
line test (FLT) to study differences in perceptual styles between North American and East 
Asian students. The FLT involves presenting participants with a square frame that has a 
single line extending downwards from the middle of top-bar. After viewing this frame, 
participants are moved to a different table with a new square frame that is either similar in 
size or slightly larger or smaller than the previous frame is displayed. Participants are then 
asked to draw the line seen in the first frame either in proportion to the new frame (relative 
task) or to exact length as seen in the first frame (absolute task). The researchers found that 
Americans were more likely to misjudge the length of the line they had to draw in the relative 
task than in the absolute task, where Asians were more likely to misjudge in the absolute than 
in the relative task. Hence, they concluded that Americans were better able to ignore 
contextual information than Asians, while Asians were better able to incorporate contextual 
information than Americans. 
Thus, when simply perceiving a visual environment, a holistic perceptual style tends 
to direct attention more towards the contextual as opposed to the focal features of a visual 
environment, whereas an analytic perceptual style tends to bias attention towards the focal 
features alone (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Norenzayan et 
al., 2010).  
Masuda and Nisbett (2001) showed a number of images with single focal objects 
placed on realistic background to American and Japanese university students. Afterwards, the 
students were shown a new set of pictures wherein some of the pictures were the same as 
before, some had their background altered, and some were completely new. The students 
were then asked to identify which focal objects had previously been seen and which had not. 
Results revealed that, in line with previous research, East Asian students are less likely to 
recognize previously seen focal objects if they have new backgrounds than Americans. These 
results indicated that biases in attention also have subsequent implications for memory as 
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well, in that what is not attended to is usually not very well encoded and as such not well 
remembered at a later stage. 
Chua et al. (2005) attempted to better understand the precise perceptual components 
affected by cultural differences by using eye-tracking to see how individuals from different 
cultures direct their attention. Their reasoning was that if there are differences in how 
individuals from different cultures attend to a scene then this should be apparent in their 
patterns of fixations and saccades. Eye-movements do not occur in one continuous slide from 
one position to another, but instead in a number of short ‘jumps’ (known as saccades) until 
the eye reaches the next visual target (Banich & Compton, 2011). The areas of a visual field 
at which the eye finally pauses, or fixates on, are known as fixations. Therefore, recording 
saccades and fixations is a good method to determine differences in perceptual strategies 
because the areas most fixated on, as well as the routes used to get there, can now be 
measured objectively. Furthermore, areas or objects deemed more important should receive 
greater attention and consequently register greater or longer fixations. To test how eye-
movement and culture interacts, Chua and colleagues used similar materials and procedure as 
those used by Masuda and Nisbett (2001) with a European-American student sample and a 
Chinese international student sample while monitoring their eye movements through an eye-
movement tracker. The students were again asked to identify which focal objects had 
previously been seen and which had not. Again, results indicated that East Asian students are 
less likely to recognize previously seen focal objects if they have new backgrounds than 
Americans. Furthermore, the eye-movement tracking indicated that East Asians tended to 
look at the background more than Americans, while Americans tend to focus on the focal 
object sooner and for longer than East Asians.  
The absence of Africa 
Although these differences in perceptual styles due to differences in self-concept have 
mostly been studied between North-Americans and East Asians, some studies have branched 
out to other regions of the world, such as South America and Eastern Europe (Kühnen et al., 
2001; Lechuga, Santos, Garza-Caballero, & Villarreal, 2011; Norenzayan et al., 2010; 
Varnum et al., 2010). These studies have also found support for the proposed link between 
perception and self-concept, e.g. that a culture that promotes an interdependent self-concept 
also promotes a holistic perceptual style. The African continent, however, has as of yet 
received no attention regarding the influence of self-concept on cognition (Miyamoto, 2013; 
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Norenzayan et al., 2010). The current drive for a culturally based or context cognisant 
understanding of human behaviour was built on the critique of psychological theories only 
being researched using WEIRD populations (Henrich et al., 2010). Overlooking an entire 
continent’s worth of cultures, however, undermines these principles of building new context 
or culturally sensitive theories of human behaviour. 
Rationale, Specific Aims, and Hypotheses. 
Studying culture on its own is a very complex task, and then attempting to link this 
culture to differences in cognitions adds yet another level of complexity to such an 
undertaking. Consequently, the current study was broken into two separate yet related 
components, namely: an initial exploration and validation of IND-COL measurement in 
South Africa; and a subsequent experimental exploration of the effects of individual level 
IND-COL variations on visual attention and memory. 
IND-COL Measurement 
Due to the multicultural nature of South Africa, the heuristic method of equating 
nation-state aggregated preferences with individual level preferences regarding self-concepts 
would be flawed. In order to accurately assess the link between self-concept and cognition 
within a South African sample, IND/COL samples would first need to be identified within 
South Africa. Unfortunately, psychometric measurement of IND-COL that may be used to 
identify IND/COL individuals has a problematic history in South Africa, based on the 
inconsistent findings regarding self-concept preferences along racial or linguistic lines. These 
inconsistencies reflect issues with the broad categorisation of IND-COL along these 
ambiguous categories, especially within an increasingly integrated society. White and Black 
South Africans are geographically closely spaced, share numerous social institutions, and 
have large overlaps in media exposure to name but a few of the factors that underpin 
significant cultural exchange (Binikos & Rugunanan, 2015; Miyamoto, 2013; Triandis, 
2010). Consequently, it may be assumed that these two groups are very likely not as 
culturally separated as Americans and Chinese. These issues therefore exclude the possibility 
of choosing IND or COL groups based on race or language as proxies for culture. Therefore, 
the first aim of this dissertation was to evaluate one of the existing measures of IND-COL in 
terms of its psychometric properties as well as its dimensionality and factor structure within 
South Africa. Due to the emphasis on race and language in previous South African studies, 
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however, the actual importance or influence of these two factors was also tested in terms of 
their relationship with quantitatively measured IND-COL.  
 
The first phase of the study tested the following hypotheses: 
1. Does the HVIC exhibit construct validity and reliability in measuring IND-COL 
in the South African context? 
2. Do scores on the HVIC differ as a function of race? 
3. Do scores on the HVIC differ as a function of language? 
4. How well do race or language predict scores on the HVIC? 
ANA-HOL Measurement 
The current absence of African samples in the building of culturally sensitive theories 
on cognition is a serious problem in the literature. The second aim of this dissertation was to 
further knowledge by testing current assumptions on the influence of culture on cognition 
within the South African context. IND-COL is believed to be the foundation of a large 
portion of cultural differences in cognition and therefore would be the most obvious place to 
start adding Africa to the literature. The second study therefore set out to test the assumption 
that differences in self-concept strongly influence differences in perceptual style within a 
South African sample. 
Although evidence regarding self-concepts in South Africa has shown mixed results, 
the general attitude is that there is a difference in self-concepts between different population 
groups within South Africa. Black South Africans are believed to generally possess more 
interdependent self-concepts, while White South Africans are believed to generally possess 
independent self-concepts. Coloured and Indian South Africans are believed to lie somewhere 
between these two groups on their preferences (Adams et al., 2012; Booysen, 2001; Hofstede, 
1980; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Language based differences are seen to follow these race 
based distinctions as well, with African language speaking South Africans preferring 
interdependent self-concepts, and English speaking South Africans independent self-concepts 
(Eaton & Louw, 2000; Valchev, 2012). If these differences do in fact exist in a real manner, 
then theoretically differences in perception or attention strategies should exist as well. The 
multicultural nature of South Africa should provide groups of independent and 
interdependent individuals, and these groups should theoretically employ markedly different 
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attentional strategies (ANA vs HOL) when engaging in perceptual tasks. Unfortunately, no 
evidence exists to substantiate such a claim.  
 
The second phase of this study therefore tested the following hypotheses: 
1. Will interdependent South Africans display a greater number of eye saccades and 
fixations to/on backgrounds than independent South Africans while watching images 
with a single focal object on a realistic background? 
2. Will independent South Africans fixate on focal objects faster and for longer than 
interdependent South Africans, while watching images with a single focal object on a 
realistic background? 
3. Will interdependent South Africans’ accuracy be affected more than independent 
South Africans’ accuracy by changes to backgrounds during an object recognition 
task? 
4. Will performance differences on the tasks between independent and interdependent 
South Africans be similar to those between Americans and Chinese in the Chua et al. 
(2005) study? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology & Results 
IND-COL Measurement 
Materials and Procedure 
The HVIC Scale by Triandis and Gelfand (1998) was selected for this study as it is 
based on one of the most widely used measures available, i.e. the Singelis (1994) Self 
Construal Scale (SCS). The HVIC has also been shown to have promising reliability and 
construct validity within South Africa (Györkös et al., 2012). The survey consisted of an 
online version of the HVIC, slightly adapted to be more relevant to a student population. The 
survey consisted of four subscales: The HI, VI, HC, and VC subscales. Each subscale 
consisted of four questions (See Table 3). Over the space of four months the survey was sent 
out twice to the entire database of students at the University of Cape Town (UCT), and once 
to UCT undergraduate Psychology students. The university wide survey was done via the 
Research Invitation Newsletter facility provided by the UCT Department of Student Affairs. 
The undergraduate Psychology student survey was done through the Student Research 
Participation Programme (SRPP) provided by the UCT Department of Psychology. 
Table 3. Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale and scoring (Adapted 
from Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) 
Rate on a 9 point scale (1 = Strongly Agree to 9 = Strongly Disagree). 
Horizontal individualism 
1. I'd rather depend on myself than others.  
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.  
3. I often do "my own thing."  
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.  
Vertical individualism 
1. It is important that I do my job better than others.  
2. Winning is everything.  
3. Competition is the law of nature.  
4. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.  
Horizontal collectivism 
1. If a coworker/fellow student/peer gets a prize, I would feel proud. 
2. The well-being of my coworker/fellow student/peers is important to me. 
3. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. 
4. I feel good when I cooperate with others. 
Vertical collectivism 
1. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.  
2. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when 1 have to sacrifice what I want.  
3. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.  
4. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. 
Note: slight alterations of scale refers to addition of “/fellow student/peer” to items 1 and 2 for the 
Horizontal collectivism subscale. 
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Participants 
A total of 1380 valid1 responses were collected. Of these respondents 33.5% were 
African (n=462), 13% were Coloured (n=179), and 42.2% were White (n=583). The majority 
(65.3%, n=901) indicated that they spoke English as their home language, while 7.3% 
(n=101) spoke Afrikaans, and 27.4% (n=378) spoke one of South Africa’s national African 
languages2. Of these respondents 40.7% were male (n=293), 59.3% female (n=427), and the 
average age was 21.9 years (SD = 4.9)3. 
Table 4. Participant Demographics 
 Language  
Race English Afrikaans African Total 
African 88 (6.4%) 2 (0.1%) 372 (27%) 462 (33.5%) 
Coloured 164 (11.9%) 14 (1%) 1 (0.1%) 179 (13%) 
White 506 (36.7%) 77 (5.6%) 0 (0%) 583 (42.2%) 
Asian 50 (3.6%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.1%) 51 (3.7%) 
Indian 30 (2.2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 30 (2.2%) 
Other 21 (1.5%) 1 (0.1%) 0 (0%) 22 (1.6%) 
Prefer not to 
answer 
42 (3%) 7 (0.5%) 4 (0.3%) 53 (3.8%) 
Total 901 (65.3%) 101 (7.3%) 378 (27.4%) 1380 (100%) 
Results 
Psychometric Evaluation 
Analyses of internal consistency revealed overall satisfactory alphas (α >.7; N = 
1380) for the combined Individualism (IND) and the combined Collectivism (COL) scales as 
well as for all subscales (See Table 5). This remained mostly the same across racial or 
language groups with the exception of HI for ‘White’ and ‘Afrikaans’ groups with alphas of 
.690 and .660 respectively. While not above the .7 general standard, these are still reasonably 
                                                 
1 In order to control for any foreign or exchange students, all respondents who indicated their language as 
‘Other’, i.e. not an official SA language, were excluded. All responses that had missing data for the HVIC scale 
were also excluded.  
2 African languages included isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sesotho sa Leboa, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, 
Tshivenda, and Xitsonga. 
3 Age and sex was only obtained for just over half of the respondents (52.2%, n=720). 
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strong indicators of internal consistency given the small number of items in the subscale (4 
items per subscale). 
 
Table 5. Cronbach's Alphas for Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and 
Collectivism Scale 
Scale α N of items 
IND .746 8 
COL .768 8 
HI .736 4 
VI .787 4 
HC .732 4 
VC .783 4 
 
Due to the survey being sent out with at least one month interval between surveys, a 
small number of the respondents were identified as having completed the survey twice (N = 
97). These responses were grouped together in order to complete a test-retest reliability 
analysis of the measure. Both the combined IND and COL scales had strong positive 
correlations of above .7. The VI and VC subscale also had strong positive correlations of 
above .7, and the HI and HC subscales and positive but moderate correlations (.461 and .527 
respectively). All correlations were significant at p ≤ 0.01 level. Consequently, the HVIC 
exhibited a good test-retest reliability. 
 
 
Table 6. Test-retest correlations for Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and 
Collectivism scales 
Scale r. CIs 
IND .740** .635 - .818 
COL .730** .621 - .811 
HI .461** .289 - .604 
VI .777** .684 - .845 
HC .527** .367 - .657 
VC .737** .631 - .816 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
46 
 
 
The combined IND and COL scales had a weak positive correlation (r=.139; p<.01) 
indicating an orthogonal relationship between the two based on the r < .2 cut-off advocated 
by Taras et al. (2014). HI and VI, as well as VI and VC had weak positive correlations 
(r=.236 and r=.227 respectively; p<.01 for both); HC and VC had a moderate positive 
correlation (r=.315; p<.01); and lastly, HI and VC also had a weak positive correlation 
(r=.096; p<.01). Although the correlations between HI and VI and VI and VC are above .2, 
they can still be seen as small enough to indicate independence (they only have a shared 
variance of just over 5%). Based on the Taras et al. (2014) standard of r > .3 to indicate non-
independence, HC and VC are the only scales that are not independent. The correlations 
between scales tended to be quite similar across racial and language groups with the 
exception of VI and VC which had a strong positive correlation (r=.394; p<.01) for the 
‘Afrikaans’ group, indicating non-independence of those two subscales. 
 
Table 7. Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale correlations 
 IND COL HI VI HC VC 
IND 1 .139** .652** .891** -.033 .222** 
COL .139** 1 .052 .147** .745** .868** 
HI .652** .052 1 .236** -.030 .096** 
VI .891** .147** .236** 1 -.024 .227** 
HC -.033 .745** -.030 -.024 1 .315** 
VC .222** .868** .096** .227** .315** 1 
Note: ** p < .001 
  
A factor analysis was conducted on the 16 items to assess construct validity. A 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was done with Varimax rotation. Four components 
with eigenvalues above one were identified accounting for a total of 59.949% of variance. 
Each of the subscales loaded quite prominently on separate components, further supporting 
the distinctness of the four constructs (HI, VI, HC, and VC). The following items had the 
highest loading on each of the components (See Table 8): “Winning is everything.” had a 
factor loading of .817 on component 1; “Family members should stick together, no matter 
what sacrifices are required.” had a factor loading of .842 on component 2; “I rely on myself 
most of the time; I rarely rely on others.” had a factor loading of .817 on component 3; and “I 
feel good when I cooperate with others.” had a factor loading of .784 on component 4. 
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The four component model was found across racial and language groups with the 
exception of the ‘Afrikaans’ group that had five components with Eigenvalues greater than 
one. Inspection of the factor loadings revealed only a single item with a loading above .3 on 
the 5th factor (“My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me”, r 
=.893). Forcing a 4 factor model, however, only slightly decreased total variance explained 
(70.846% vs 64.574%), and the item loaded adequately on the same component as the rest of 
the items in its subscale (r = .330). 
 
 
Figure 4. Scree plot of eigenvalues for Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and 
Collectivism factor analysis 
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Table 8. Factor Loadings for the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism 
scale 
Items 1 2 3 4 
 
Horizontal Individualism     
1. I'd rather depend on myself than 
others. .077 -.010 .784 .021 
2. I rely on myself most of the time; I 
rarely rely on others. .116 -.075 .817 .042 
3. I often do "my own thing." 
.108 .009 .765 .117 
4. My personal identity, independent 
of others, is very important to me. .059 -.044 .559 -.128 
 
Vertical Individualism     
1. It is important that I do my job 
better than others. .745 -.075 .230 -.041 
2. Winning is everything. 
.817 -.152 .126 .050 
3. Competition is the law of nature. 
.731 -.105 .110 .008 
4. When another person does better 
than I do, I get tense and aroused. .778 -.028 -.048 .049 
 
Horizontal Collectivism     
1. If a coworker/fellow student/peer 
gets a prize, I would feel proud. .151 .165 -.181 .684 
2. The well-being of my 
coworkers/fellow students/peers is 
important to me. 
.099 .079 -.058 .771 
3. To me, pleasure is spending time 
with others. -.155 .096 .174 .711 
4. I feel good when I cooperate with 
others. -.017 .141 .076 .784 
 
Vertical Collectivism     
1. Parents and children must stay 
together as much as possible. -.059 .746 -.010 .054 
2. It is my duty to take care of my 
family, even when I have to sacrifice 
what I want. 
-.106 .808 -.062 .077 
3. Family members should stick 
together, no matter what sacrifices are 
required. 
-.145 .842 -.039 .112 
4. It is important to me that I respect 
the decisions made by my groups. -.049 .637 -.023 .286 
Eigenvalues 3.462 2.781 1.899 1.450 
Note: Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Major loadings for each item are in bold 
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HVIC Descriptive Statistics & Means comparisons 
Two mixed between-within subject ANOVAs revealed significant interactions 
between IND-COL scales for Race (F6,1373 = 4.280, p < .001) and Language (F2,1377 = 8.564, 
p < .001). Mean IND scores were significantly lower than mean COL scores for the African, 
Coloured, and White racial groups, and the Afrikaans language group was the only group 
whose mean IND score was not significantly lower than its mean COL score (it was near 
identical; 53.56 vs 53.46). See Table 9 for means, SDs, and Cohen’s d effect sizes. 
To further explore the interactions a between subjects Factorial MANOVA (2 x 3 x 7) 
was conducted on IND-COL scales for Race and Language. Significant main effects were 
found for Race and Language (F12,2726 =1.812, p = .041; F4,2726 = 2.666, p = .031 
respectively). There was no significant interaction. Univariate analyses, with a Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha of .025, revealed a significant effect for Race on COL (F6,1364 =2.753, p = 
.012). After adjusting alpha, Language on COL only approached significance (F2,1364 =3.470, 
p = .031). All significant effects accounted for only a small portion of variance, with 𝜂2 < 
.02. A Factorial MANOVA (4 x 3 x 7) for the HVIC subscales revealed no significant main 
or interaction effects for either Race or Language. 
 
Due to the relatively small sample sizes of the Asian, Indian, Other, and Prefer not to 
Answer racial categories (N = 51, 30, 22, and 53 respectively), further discussion of means 
comparisons will focus more on the African, Coloured, and White groups (N = 462, 179, and 
583 respectively). All three of these groups scored significantly higher on COL than on IND 
(p < .001, d = .48, .62, and .2 respectively). African race group had the highest mean for COL 
(M = 58.76, SD = 8.11), followed by Coloured (M = 57.29, SD = 8.02) and then White (M = 
54.53, SD = 8.2). Both African and Coloured were significantly higher than White (p < .01, d 
= 0.52; p < .01, d = 0.33 respectively), but not from each other (p = .152, d = 0.194). 
Interestingly the African Language group had the highest mean for both of the combined 
scales as well as all subscales. Comparisons of the subscale means show a mostly similar 
score average across language or racial groups, with the exception of VC where the African 
language and racial group tended to score relatively high. It is also interesting to note how 
similar the patterns of subscale means are across the language or racial groups. All groups 
scored highest on HI and HC, and lowest on VI. The greatest variation in scores was for VC, 
where the African language group seemed to score much higher than both English and 
Afrikaans. 
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Lastly, Males and Females had a very similar pattern of scores, but with Males 
scoring slightly higher for IND in total and for VI in particular. However, including Sex 
within the Factorial MANOVA model (2 x 2 x 3 x 7) removed all significant main effects. 
This change should be interpreted with caution though, due to the markedly different samples 
sizes for Sex excluded vs Sex included (N = 1380 vs N = 720 respectively). 
 
 
Table 9. Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism combined Individualism-
Collectivism scale descriptive statistics 
Scale IND   COL     
  Mean N Mean N Cohen's d 
Language 
      
 English 52.59 (8.91) 901 55.5 (8.17) 901 -0.34** 
Afrikaans 53.56 (9.13) 101 53.46 (9.36) 101 0.01 
African 54.98 (8.53) 378 59.37 (8.01) 378 -0.53** 
Race       
 African 54.76 (8.67) 462 58.76 (8.11) 462 -0.48** 
Coloured 52.05 (8.62) 179 57.19 (8.02) 179 -0.62** 
White 52.86 (8.62) 583 54.53 (8.2) 583 -0.20** 
Asian 52.12 (9.77) 51 57.39 (7.39) 51 -0.61* 
Indian 53.43 (9.56) 30 56.5 (9.66) 30 -0.32 
Prefer not to answer 50.66 (9.61) 53 52.51 (9.59) 53 -0.19 
Other 54.41 (9.16) 22 57.5 (7.79) 22 -0.36 
Note: **p<.001; *p<.01. SD in brackets. 
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Figure 5. Individualism-Collectivism Scores By Race 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Individualism-Collectivism Scores By Language         
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Table 10. Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism subscales descriptive statistics 
Subscale HI VI HC VC 
  Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Language   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
English    30.43 (4.19) 901 22.17 (6.86) 901 29.24 (4.21) 901 26.26 (5.88) 901 
Afrikaans 31.15 (3.62) 101 22.42 (6.55) 101 28.77 (4.95) 101 24.68 (6.73) 101 
African 31.81 (3.93) 378 23.17 (6.97) 378 29.96 (4.68) 378 29.42 (5.04) 378 
Race 
        African 31.55 (4.08) 462 23.22 (6.91) 462 29.74 (4.58) 462 29.02 (5.21) 462 
Coloured 30.58 (4.02) 179 21.47 (6.89) 179 29.47 (4.25) 179 27.72 (5.66) 179 
White 30.37 (4.03) 583 22.49 (6.62) 583 29.08 (4.22) 583 25.46 (5.95) 583 
Asian 31.1 (4.31) 51 21.02 (7.56) 51 30.57 (4.34) 51 26.82 (5.47) 51 
Indian 30.4 (4.66) 30 23.03 (7.48) 30 29.43 (5.48) 30 27.07 (5.71) 30 
Prefer not 
to answer 
30.85 (4.65) 53 19.81 (7.15) 53 28.15 (4.81) 53 24.36 (6.74) 53 
Other 31.82 (4.05) 22 22.59 (7.2) 22 30.73 (3.57) 22 26.77 (7.08) 22 
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 Regression 
A number of regression models were tested to assess the predictive value of Race, 
Language, and Sex on the level of Individualism and Collectivism as determined by the 
HVIC. Initial regressions excluded Sex due to the reduced sample size. Separate regressions 
were run for the two combined IND and COL scales4. White, English, and Female were set as 
the reference groups for Race, Language, and Sex variables (respectively) in all regressions. 
See table 11 for R2 and Beta values. 
The full regression model for IND, excluding Sex, accounted for only 1.7% of 
variance in scores (F 4, 1379 = 6.030, p < .01). There were no statistically significant predictors 
either. The full regression model that included Sex explained 4.1% of the variance in IND 
scores (F 5, 719 = 6.174, p < .01), and the Male group significantly predicting IND (B = -.287, 
p < .01).  
For COL, the full regression model, excluding Sex, accounted for 6.8% of variance in 
scores (F4, 1379 = 25.171, p < .01). Coloured (B = -.358, p < .01) and African Language groups 
(B = -.432, p < .01) were statistically significant predictors. The model including Sex 
accounted for 6.3% of variance in COL (F5, 719 = 9.532, p < .01), with the Coloured (B = -
.395, p < .01) and African Language (B = -.476, p < .01) groups again as significant 
predictors. 
It is important to note, though, that race and language had a significant and strong 
correlation (ΦCramer = .606, p < .001), meaning the effects of one cannot easily be 
disentangled from the other. Any conclusions regarding such effects should therefore be done 
with caution. 
 
The same regression models were run on each of the four subscales5. The full model, 
excluding Sex, was able to explain 2.8% of the variance in scores for HI, 0.8% for VI, 1.1% 
for HC, and 9% for VC. The model including Sex explained 4.3% for HI, 4.3% for VI, 2.2% 
for HC, and 7.1% for VC. All final models were significant (p < .05). The African Language 
group was a significant predictor (p < .01) in all subscales, with the exception of VI, 
regardless of whether Sex was included. The Coloured and African racial groups, as well as 
the Afrikaans language group were also significant predictors of VC (p < .05) when Sex was 
                                                 
4 Dependent variables were transformed due to presence of moderate negative skewness in both DVs. Scale 
direction was reversed and transformed scale scores ranged from 8.5-1 for the combined IND and combined 
COL scales. 
5 Similar transformations of DVs were done for subscales. Scale direction was reversed and transformed scale 
scores ranged from 5.7-1 for all subscales. 
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excluded, but only the Coloured and African language groups remained significant (p < .01) 
when Sex was included. The Male group significantly predicted only VI (B = -.352, p < 
.001). 
 
Table 11. R2 and Beta coefficients for survey regression models 
  Beta values 
  R2 African Race Coloured 
African 
Language 
Afrikaans 
IND .017 -.153 .068 -.142 -.106 
COL .068 -.180 -.315*** -.434*** .203 
HI .028 -.023 -.013 -.284** -.143 
VI .008 -.170 .090 .019 -.028 
HC .011 .072 -.060 -.243** .077 
VC .090 -.284** -.348*** -.355*** .195* 
Note: ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05; White group used as reference for African & Coloured groups; 
English group used as reference for African Language and Afrikaans groups. Values are for Sex 
excluded. Inclusion did not significantly change values, with exception of VC for African Race and 
Afrikaans, p > .05 for both. 
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ANA-HOL Measurement 
Method 
Design 
The aim of this study was to assess whether cognitive strategies in perception and 
attention (ANA vs HOL) differed between South Africans with interdependent versus 
independent self-concepts. The experimental procedure and materials of Chua et al. (2005) 
were chosen due to their use of eye-tracking procedures in combination with a previously 
used memory task that showed significant differences in performance as a function of self-
concept. The eye-tracking aspect was believed to add a more direct method of measuring 
attentional strategies, and therefore would provide more accurate information regarding the 
perceptual strategies employed by participants. The laboratory task was therefore split into 
two phases, the first being an eye-tracking phase, and the second the object recognition and 
memory task phase. 
A single-factor between-groups design (Interdependent vs Independent self-concept) 
was used with participants grouped according to scores on the HVIC. The two groups were 
compared on 7 eye-tracking metrics, 9 recognition memory measures, and 4 recognition 
memory reaction time measures. 
Participants 
Due to the multicultural nature of South Africa and the poor predictive power of race 
or language for IND-COL, participants were selected on the basis of their scores on the 
HVIC. All respondents to the first survey who indicated interest in participating in future 
research (n = 473) were divided into two groups through the use of k-means cluster division, 
with a maximum of 2 clusters defined. The group with a higher mean for total Collectivism 
(totCOL) than total Individualism (totIND) was defined as the Collectivist group. The group 
with a higher mean for totIND than totCOL was defined as the Individualist group. Within 
the Collectivist group, the 60 lowest on totIND were selected from the final Collectivist 
sample group. Within the Individualist group, the 60 lowest on totCOL was selected to form 
the final Individualist sample group. It was believed that this procedure for recruitment would 
provide two distinctly different samples: A strongly interdependent group, and a strongly 
independent group. Theoretically these two groups, divided solely on IND-COL scores and 
presumably on the extremes of a dichotomous IND-COL spectrum, should reliably use either 
analytic or holistic attentional strategies.  
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These respondents (n = 120) were contacted and asked to come in for the laboratory 
based tasks. Due to an insufficient response rate and also to adjust for gender imbalances in 
responses, two additional recruitment surveys were sent out at later stages. These additional 
surveys were sorted by only selecting respondents if their totIND and totCOL scores fell 
within the minimum and maximum values of either groups as defined by the first set of 
groups created. Additional respondents were then selected at random from this newly sorted 
sample to be contacted and included in the laboratory based tasks. 
A total of 60 individuals participated in the laboratory tasks (29 IND; 31 COL), with 
an average age of 21.9 (SD = 6.1). All participants who completed the laboratory tasks also 
completed a HVIC post-test. Based on the post-test scores, 5 participants were excluded from 
all analyses due to markedly different totIND and/or totCOL scores. Fisher’s Exact tests 
showed no significant differences in race or language between the two groups (X24 = 2.056, p 
= .841; X22 = .982, p = .696). 1 participant had incomplete eye-tracking data and 2 
participants’ recognition data was lost due to power outages. 2 participants were excluded 
from eye-tracking analysis and 1 from recognition analysis as outliers6. This left a final 
sample of 52 (25 IND; 27 COL) for the eye-tracking task and 52 (25 IND; 27 COL)7 for the 
recognition task. Gender ratios were equal for both tasks (23 Male; 29 Female). All 
participants were compensated 50 ZAR for their participation, including those whose 
participation was cut short due to the power outages. 
 
Table 12. Analytic vs Holistic study participant demographics 
 IND COL Total 
Eye-Tracking     
  Male 11 12 23 
  Female 14 15 29 
Total 25 27 52 
Recognition     
   Male 11 12 23 
   Female 14 15 29 
Total 25 27 52 
 
                                                 
6 Eye-movements were significantly anomalous such as remaining fixated on a single spot; Recognition scores 
indicated guessing or response set (e.g. answering ‘yes’ for all images). Behavioural patterns were not 
theoretically plausible. 
7 Not all participants were included in both datasets, the group Ns were only coincidentally equal. 
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Materials and Procedure 
Eye-movements were recorded using a Tobii X120 eye-tracker (120Hz) which tracks 
eye-movement through a sensor positioned underneath the computer screen. Tobii Studio 
Software package was used to create and run the experiment, as well as record data for the 
first task, while E-Prime 2 was used to create and run the experiment and record the data for 
the second task.  
The original images used by Chua et al. (2005) were obtained and were used as is in 
this study. These images are comprised of various realistic animals and inanimate objects 
placed on similarly realistic backgrounds. A total of 36 pictures with a single, focal object in 
the foreground were created (20 foregrounded animals, and 16 foregrounded inanimate 
objects). This set of 36 was used in the eye-movement tracking task of the Chua et. al. 
experiment and was used again as is in this study (See figures 6 & 7). For the object 
recognition task, Chua et. al. merged the previous 36 pictures with 36 new focal objects and 
backgrounds to create a new set of 72 pictures (See figures 8-11). In this new set half of the 
previous focal objects were present on their original backgrounds while the other half were 
presented on new background. Furthermore, half of the new objects were presented on 
backgrounds from the original pictures and the other half of the new objects were presented 
on new background. As a result, four different picture combinations were created: (1) 18 
original objects on original backgrounds, (2) 18 original objects on new backgrounds, (3), 18 
new objects on original backgrounds, and (4) 18 new objects on new backgrounds. This set of 
72 pictures was also used as is in the object recognition task in this study. All participants 
saw the same pictures and the same trial sequences in the original study, and did so as well in 
this study. Procedure for this study replicated that of the original study as close as possible, 
with differences in the mathematical tasks completed during distraction phase as the main 
alterations. 
Eye-movement tracking 
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen with approximately 70cm 
between them and the screen. An adjustable chair was used in order to ensure that 
participants’ eye level, relative to the screen, was as similar as possible. Tobii Studio also has 
a built-in calibration procedure that assists with ensuring recording quality, which was used 
for all participants. Focal objects and Backgrounds were identified as separate Areas of 
Interest (AOIs) in Tobii Studio (See Figures 14-17; Focal Object shaded purple; Background 
shaded blue). 
58 
 
A visit was counted when an individual’s gaze moves into an area defined as either 
focal object or background from outside of the area. This is different from fixations as 
multiple fixations can occur within a single visit to an AOI. Another visit will only be 
counted if gaze moves out of this AOI and then moves back in again. 
Participants were first shown a number of instruction screens as well as a brief 
sequence of sample pictures to familiarise participants with how the task would proceed and 
what they would need to do. Eye-tracking metrics only started recording after these 
introductory screens ended. The recorded section of the task consisted of the set of 36 
pictures, with a blank screen with a cross (+) in the middle inserted before each image was 
presented. Participants were instructed to focus their eyes on the cross every time the cross 
screen appears to reset eye-fixation. They were also asked to verbally rate each picture on a 
scale from 1-7 for how much they like the picture (1 indicating ‘don’t like it at all’; 4 
indicating ‘neutral’; and 7 indicating ‘like it a lot’). Each picture was shown for a period of 3 
seconds. Once all 36 pictures had been presented participants were moved across the room to 
a different computer where they completed a number of arithmetic problems for 10 minutes. 
Object-recognition task 
After completing the distractor task, participants were asked to move back to the first 
computer to complete the next task in the study. For this task participants were once again 
shown a number of instruction screens as well as a brief sequence of sample pictures 
detailing how the task will proceed and what they will need to do. Eye-tracking data was not 
recorded for this task.  Participants were shown the set of 72 pictures comprised of altered, 
original, and new pictures. Each picture was displayed for 3 seconds wherein participants 
needed to indicate whether they had previously seen the focal object in that picture by either 
pressing ‘j’ for ‘yes’ or ‘f’ for ‘no’. Participants were told that if the picture disappears before 
a key was pressed, they can still do so before the next picture was displayed. If participants 
are unsure they were asked to guess. In the instruction screens, a sample picture was shown 
indicating what was meant by focal object and what was meant as background. A fixation 
screen was once again displayed in between each picture to reset eye-fixation.  
 
Debriefing and Compensation 
After completing the object recognition task participants were debriefed regarding the 
true aims and nature of the tasks and given their compensation for participation. 
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Figure 7. Phase 1 Sample image 
 
 
Figure 8. Phase 1 Sample image 
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Figure 9. Phase 1 Original Image 
 
 
Figure 10. Phase 1 Original Image 
 
Figure 11. Phase 2 Altered Background 
 
  
Figure 12. Phase 2 Altered Focal Object 
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Figure 13. Experiment Procedure 
 
The following data were recorded for each participant: 
 
• Eye-tracking (7) 
o Number of fixations on focal objects or backgrounds; 
o Number of visits to focal objects or backgrounds; 
o Average time to first fixation on focal objects or backgrounds; 
o Average duration of individual fixations on focal objects or backgrounds; 
o Average duration of visits to focal objects or backgrounds; 
o Total duration of fixations on focal objects or backgrounds; 
o Total duration of visits to focal objects or backgrounds. 
• Recognition Memory Accuracy (9) 
o Old Object on Old Background 
o New Object on New Background 
o Old Object on New Background 
o New Object on Old Background 
o Old Object 
o New Object 
o Old Background 
o New Background 
o Overall Total 
• Recognition Memory Reaction Time (4) 
o Old Object - Old Background 
o New Object - New Background 
o Old Object - New Background 
o New Object - Old Background 
Phase 1: Eye-
tracking Task
10 min 
Distractor Task
Phase 2: Object 
Recognition 
Task
Debriefing and 
Compensation
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Results 
Tables 13 and 14 provide overviews of the IND-COL means comparisons with effect 
sizes for the eye-tracking and object recognition results. Table 15 provides an overview of the 
Background vs Focal Object means comparisons for important eye-tracking measures. Table 
16 provides an overview of the accuracy means comparisons for different types of image 
combinations in the object recognition task. 
A Mahalanobis distance analysis revealed three outliers in the eye-tracking data (df = 
12, X2 > 32.91, p <.001), all within the IND group, and one in the recognition data (df = 13, 
X2 > 34.53, p <.001) within the COL group. Recognition scores and eye-tracking patterns did 
not seem theoretically implausible, therefore removal of outliers did not seem warranted. As 
a matter of precaution, however, two sets of all analyses were performed, one with the 
outliers included and one without. A number of paired t-tests were performed to test for 
differences between the different measures within each of the groups. MANOVAs were 
conducted to determine significant differences between the two groups on each of the 
measures. 
The MANOVAs found no significant effects between the two groups on any of eye-
tracking or object recognition accuracy measures (F12,39 = 2.019, p = .05; F11,40=1.198, p = 
.32 respectively). Excluding outliers only marginally altered these results (F12,36 = 1.911, p = 
.06; F11,39=1.277, p = .27 respectively). 
A very similar pattern of eye-movements was found for both the IND and COL group. 
Both groups spent significantly more time looking at focal objects than background (t (24) = -
6.455, p < .001 for IND; t (26) = -3.839, p < .001 for COL). Both were also worse at correctly 
recognising objects when only the background was altered in comparison to when only the 
object was altered (t (24) = -2,577, p = .02 for IND; t (26) = -4,479, p < .001 for COL). The 
only real difference between the two groups were the number of visits to focal objects versus 
backgrounds. The IND group did not have a significant difference between number of visits 
to backgrounds versus focal objects (t (24) = 1.813, p = .082). The COL group, however, 
made significantly more visits to the backgrounds than to the focal objects (t (26) = 2.327, p 
= .028). Removal of the outliers, however, caused the difference in the IND group to become 
significant as well (t (21) = 2.218, p = .038).  
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Figure 14. Fixation Duration Heat Map 
  
 
Figure 15. Fixation Duration Heat Map - COL Group  
 
Figure 16. Fixations and Saccades Movement Pattern 
  
 
Figure 17. Fixation Duration Heat Map - IND Group
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Table 13. Eye-tracking Measures Individualism-Collectivism Means Comparisons 
 Group IND   COL     
  Mean N Mean N Cohen's d 
Time to First Fixation on Backgrounda 2.18 (1.05) 25 2.05 (1.11) 27 0.12 
Time to First Fixation on Focal Objecta 0.02 (0.04) 25 0.03 (0.07) 27 -0.14 
Fixation Duration on Backgrounda 0.22 (0.05) 25 0.23 (0.03) 27 -0.28 
Fixation Duration on Focal Objecta 0.25 (0.07) 25 0.26 (0.04) 27 -0.05 
Total Fixation Duration on Backgrounda 33.93 (7.85) 25 37.76 (8.47) 27 -0.47 
Total Fixation Duration on Focal Objecta 49.32 (8.18) 25 49.46 (8.02) 27 -0.02 
Fixation Count on Background 157 (31.57) 25 163.44 (31.19) 27 -0.21 
Fixation Count on Focal Object 204.24 (51.18) 25 194.70 (31.91) 27 0.22 
Visit Duration on Backgrounda 0.53 (0.10) 25 0.53 (.010) 27 0.06 
Visit Duration on Focal Objecta 0.81 (0.17) 25 0.73 (0.19) 27 0.42 
Total Visit Duration on Backgrounda 38.39 (7.75) 25 41.70 (9.03) 27 -0.39 
Total Visit Duration on Focal Objecta 56.17 (7.22) 25 54.98 (9.19) 27 0.14 
Visit Count on Background 73.16 (11.84) 25 79.59 (10.81) 27 -0.57* 
Visit Count on Focal Object 71.2 (11.48) 25 76.67 (10.02) 27 -0.51 
Note: aTime in seconds. *p =.046, p=.188 excl. outliers. SD shown in brackets. 
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Table 14. Object Recognition Results 
  IND   COL     
  Mean % Correcta N Mean % Correcta N Cohen's d 
Accuracy 
  
 
 
 
 
 Old Object on Old Background 13.16 (2.73) 73.11% 25 13.41 (3.08) 73.82% 27 -0.09 
New Object on New Background 13.16 (2.34) 73.11% 25 12.30 (2.88) 70.62% 27 0.33 
Old Object on New Background 9.36 (2.93) 52% 25 8.41 (2.45) 49.25% 27 0.37 
New Object on Old Background 11.48 (2.66) 63.78% 25 11.67 (3.23) 64.32% 27 -0.06 
Old Object 22.52 (4.81) 62.56% 25 21.81 (4.48) 60.60% 27 0.15 
New Object 24.64 (4.19) 68.44% 25 23.96 (5.35) 66.56% 27 0.14 
Old Background 24.48 (3.28) 68.44% 25 25.07 (3.16) 69.65% 27 -0.11 
New Background 22.68 (2.10) 62.56% 25 20.70 (3.97) 57.51% 27 0.59 
Overall Total 47.16 (4.57) 65.50% 25 45.78 (7.30) 64.50% 27 0.23 
Reaction Timeb 
    
 
 
 Old Object - Old Background 1415.87 (250.07)  25 1412.83 (265.05)  27 0.01 
New Object - New Background 1444.66 (271.96)  25 1408.26 (284.28)  27 0.13 
Old Object - New Background 1452.93 (274.19)  25 1450.70 (294.89)  27 0.01 
New Object - Old Background 1469.29 (288.35)  25 1420.97 (280.74)  27 0.17 
Note: aaverage % correct identification of objects for combination type. bRT shown in ms. SD shown in brackets. 
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Figure 18. Average amount of visits to background and focal objects  
(Bars represent standard error). 
 
 
Figure 19. Average total amount of time spent looking at background and 
focal objects (Bars represent standard error). 
             
 
 
Figure 20. Average fixations on background and focal objects 
(Bars represent standard error). 
 
 
Figure 21. Average time spent looking at backgrounds or focal objects 
(Bars represent standard error).
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Table 15. Eye-tracking Background vs Focal Object Comparisons 
 
IND COL IND - Excluding Outliers 
  
Background Focal Object N Cohen’s d Background Focal Object N Cohen’s d Background Focal Object 
N 
Cohen’s d 
Fixation 
Count 
157 (31.57) 204.24 (51.18) 25 -1.11*** 163.45 (31.19) 194.7 (31.91) 27 -0.99** 160.32 (30.22) 203.68 (45.89) 22 -1.12*** 
Visit 
Count 
73.16 (11.84) 71.2 (11.48) 25 0.17 79.59 (10.81) 76.67 (10.02) 27 0.28* 75.55 (10.21) 73 (10.57) 22 0.24* 
Visit 
Duration 
0.53 (0.10) 0.81 (0.17) 25 -1.98*** 0.53 (0.10) 0.73 (0.19) 27 -1.34*** 0.53 (0.09) 0.79 (0.16) 22 -1.94*** 
Total Visit 
Duration 
38.39 (7.75) 56.18 (7.22) 25 -2.37*** 41.7 (9.03) 54.98 (9.19) 27 -1.46*** 39.85 (6.58) 56.49 (7.51) 22 -2.36*** 
Note: ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05; A Visit refers to when the eyes move into an AOI, and duration is timed until it exits the AOI again. SD shown in brackets. 
 
Table 16. Object Recognition Image Combinations Accuracy Comparisons 
  OO ON N Cohen’s d OO NO N Cohen’s d ON NO N Cohen’s d 
IND 
13.88 (2.85) 8.64 (2.74) 25 1.88** 13.88 (2.85) 10.6 (2.69) 25 1.18*** 8.64 (2.74) 10.6 (2.69) 25 -0.72* 
COL 14.15 (3.15) 7.67 (2.50) 27 2.28** 14.15 (3.15) 10.78 (3.32) 27 1.04*** 7.67 (2.50) 10.78 (3.32) 27 -1.06*** 
COL Excl. 
Outliers 
14 (3.11) 7.69 (2.54) 26 2.22** 14 (3.11) 11.08 (2.99) 26 0.96*** 7.69 (2.54) 11.08 (2.99) 26 -1.22*** 
Note: ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05; OO = Original Focal Object on Original Background; ON = Original Focal Object on New Background; NO = New Focal Object on 
Original Background. SD shown in brackets. 
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Figure 22. Mean scores for object recognition by image type (Bars represent standard error). 
 
        
Figure 23. Mean Fixation Count within Focal Object and Background AOIs.  
(Bars represent standard error). Figure 24. Mean Total Visit Duration within Focal Object and 
Background AOIs (Bars represent standard error). 
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Chua et al. Means Comparisons 
Lastly, summary data for the analyses run in the study by Chua et al. (2005) was 
obtained as well. A number of one-way ANOVAs were conducted in order to directly 
compare the performance of the South African sample to that of the original sample from the 
Chua et al. (2005) study. The IV Culture had 4 levels: SA IND, SA COL, American, and 
Chinese. These ANOVAs focused on the outcomes that had shown significant differences in 
the original study. Significant main effects where found for three of these, namely Fixation 
Duration on Background (F3,93=4,323, p < .01), Fixation Duration of Focal Object 
(F3,93=6,515, p < .001), and Recognition Accuracy for Old Objects on New Backgrounds 
(F3,93= 13,708, p < .001). 
Tukey’s post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences between SA IND and 
Americans for all three of the outcomes (p < .01 for all), with the SA IND group’s fixations 
being shorter than the Americans, and also scoring worse than the Americans for the 
recognition outcome. SA COL differed significantly from Americans on Fixation Duration on 
Focal Objects and Recognition scores (p < .01), also with shorter fixation durations and lower 
scores. The SA COL group also scored significantly lower on the recognition outcome than 
the Chinese group (p = .016). Effect sizes for all significant differences were large. Table 17 
provides an overview of significant effects and Cohen’s d’s for these comparisons. Figures 23 
and 24 provides graphical comparisons of means.  
 
Table 17. Cohen's ds for means comparisons between groups 
 
SA IND vs 
American 
SA COL vs 
American 
SA IND vs 
Chinese 
SA COL vs 
Chinese 
American vs 
Chinese 
Fixation Duration 
- Background 
-0.62*** -0.52 0.11 0.72 0.7** 
Fixation Duration 
- Focal Object 
-0.69** -0.69** 0.42 0.83 0.88*** 
Recognition - Old 
object on New 
Background 
-1.62*** -2.48*** -0.39 -0.78* 1.15* 
Note: ***p<.001;**p<.01;*p<.05 
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Figure 25. Mean fixation duration for Backgrounds and Focal Objects  
(Bars represent standard error) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Mean correct answers (in %) during Object Recognition task for Old 
Objects on New Backgrounds8 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Error bars not possible as means for American and Chinese samples were given and not calculated from raw 
data. 
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Ethical Considerations 
Ethical clearance for the two phases of the study was obtained from the UCT 
Department of Student Affairs and the UCT Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
Consent was required from all participants prior to entering the study, starting with the online 
survey. Issues surrounding race and culture are of a sensitive nature in South Africa and so 
special attention was paid to explaining the nature and aims of the study to all participants as 
far as possible at the start of the initial survey. A more extensive debrief was also provided at 
the end of the laboratory phase as well as an opportunity for questions and in-depth 
discussion. 
Apart from the potentially sensitive nature of the topic, due the non-invasive and 
voluntary nature of the study, no other significant ethical issues were expected nor 
encountered. 
Summary of Results 
The purpose of the first set of analyses was to assess the usefulness of the HVIC in 
South Africa, as well as to explore the relationship between IND-COL, as measured by the 
HVIC, and race and language.  
Psychometrically the HVIC instrument was sound, with good internal consistency as 
well as test-retest reliability. A PCA also confirmed the 4 four factor model, consistent with 
the theory of four distinct constructs, i.e. Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and 
Collectivism. The orthogonal dimensionality between IND and COL for the HVIC was also 
confirmed. 
Comparisons of the means for the combined IND and COL scales revealed 
statistically significant differences in Collectivism between racial groups, specifically 
between White and Coloured or African groups. These differences were also quite sizable as 
well. Although there are significant differences between racial groups regarding COL, the 
predictive models were not very accurate. At best only explaining 7.4% of variance in COL 
scores, relying on Race as a predictor of COL tendencies should be done with caution. IND 
scores could not be significantly predicted by either race or language, although sex was a 
significant predictor. While this does support the means comparisons in indicating some kind 
of relationship regarding COL, it shows poor predictive value for the variables included. 
Caution should also be taken in comparing results between the model including and 
excluding Sex due to the differences in sample sizes.  
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The second set of analyses set out to test for differences in eye-movement patterns as 
well as performance on an object recognition task between a group of South Africans 
identified as independent and another identified as interdependent. Ultimately, no extensive 
differences were found between the two groups in the eye-tracking measures as well as in 
object recognition performance. The only statistically significant difference in eye-movement 
patterns was due to the presence of 3 outliers in the independent group. Both groups spent 
more time looking at focal objects and also did worse in the object recognition task when the 
backgrounds were altered versus when the focal objects were altered. 
 
Comparisons of means between the two SA groups and the American and Chinese 
groups from the original Chua et al. (2005) revealed very similar eye-movement patterns and 
recognition performance between the South Africans and the Chinese. The South Africans 
performed no different from the Chinese with the exception of the SA COL group who 
performed worse than the Chinese in the object recognition outcome. The Americans spent 
far more time looking at Focal objects than both the South Africans and the Chinese and also 
made fewer errors during object recognition when old objects were displayed on new 
backgrounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
This study first and foremost attempted to contribute to the literature on the link 
between culture, the self, and cognition. It specifically sought to address the issue of the lack 
of African samples in the literature. It attempted to do so by replicating a study conducted 
between American and Chinese students that found clear differences in perceptual style, with 
Americans utilizing a more analytic perceptual style and Chinese using a more holistic 
perceptual style. It was believed that these differences in perceptual style were the result of 
differences in self-concept, primed by societal differences in cultural values, namely 
Individualism vs Collectivism. It is believed that differences in IND and COL underlie the 
vast number of cross-cultural differences in cognition, which are specifically believed to 
influence a preference for one self-concept over the other (Independent vs Interdependent), 
which in turn primes a preference for one perceptual style over the other (Analytic vs 
Holistic).  
Most, if not all, studies on this link between IND-COL and perceptual style used the 
assumption of equating nation-state with societal culture (or rather with a general cultural 
tendency towards either IND or COL within the national population). These studies typically 
rely on previous research, such as that of Hofstede (1980), to label one country as IND and 
another as COL, and then draw a random sample population from the IND country to 
compare to a random sample population from the COL country in order to test for differences 
in cognition as a result of differences in self-concept. This commonly used sampling method, 
however, cannot be easily applied to a multicultural nation such as South Africa. Some 
previous research in South Africa has shown significant differences in self-concept across its 
population, usually along racial and linguistic lines. These differences are not surprising 
given the very recent systemic racially based cultural separation enforced during Apartheid, 
which was a continuation of the racial separation during South Africa’s colonial history. 
Consequently, one cannot simply take a number of South Africans at random and compare 
them to a number of Americans taken at random and draw causal inferences regarding the 
link between IND-COL and cognition. Results will be far more sensitive to sampling biases 
than may be the case in other nations (although globalisation and the unprecedented cultural 
exchange brought on by social media may throw the whole notion of nation-state equating a 
distinct culture in doubt). How then can one go about studying this theorised link between 
culture and cognition within a multicultural nation such as South Africa? 
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For the purpose of this study it was believed it would suffice to draw on the 
widespread practice of psychometrically measuring IND-COL, the very practice that formed 
the basis for categorising one nation as IND and another as COL. It was theorised that one 
could identify groups of individuals who are either more Independent or more Interdependent 
in their self-construal based on their IND-COL scores on a measure specifically validated for 
the South African context. South African Individualistic and Collectivistic groups could then 
be identified for use in studying the link between IND-COL and ANA-HOL in the South 
African context. Unfortunately, the current state of psychometrically measuring IND-COL in 
South Africa is quite poor, with most studies reporting inconsistent or contradictory findings, 
as well as poor psychometric properties (when these were reported). Only one study had 
purposefully evaluated the psychometric reliability and validity of two IND-COL measures 
with a South African sample, but did not pay attention to any possible racial or linguistic 
differences.  
A secondary aim of this current study, therefore, was to explore the psychometric 
reliability and validity of an IND-COL measure (the HVIC) within a South African sample, 
with a specific goal of comparing racial and linguistic differences. Due to the increased cross-
racial or cross-cultural interactions since the end of Apartheid in 1994, this study also sought 
to ascertain the actual utility of race or language as predictors for levels of IND and COL. 
This also served as the starting point to identify potential participants for the subsequent self 
and cognition study phase. 
 
Measuring and predicting IND and COL in a South African student population 
Results from the psychometric evaluation of the HVIC indicated overall good 
reliability and validity for the measure, regardless of race or language, replicating and 
supporting the results obtained by Györkös et al. (2012). Factor analysis also supported the 
distinctness of the four underlying components of the HVIC, a result also found by Györkös 
et al. (2012). The measure, therefore, seems to be accurately and validly measuring what it is 
supposed to be measuring. The bidimensional conceptualisation of IND-COL found for the 
original HVIC created by Singelis et al. (1995) was also found in this study, and without any 
significant differences across race or language groups either. So conceptually in terms of 
IND-COL dimensionality, this measure also holds up well in the sample used. Based on these 
findings, it can be assumed that the shortened version of the HVIC used in this study is a 
good measure to use for studying IND-COL within a South African sample. 
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Previous research on self-concept in South Africa have always made use of race or 
language categories to study cultural differences in terms of IND-COL. The general 
consensus has been that due to their different socio-historical backgrounds South Africans of 
African descent tend to emphasise an interdependent self-concept, while South Africans of 
European descent tend to emphasise an independent self-concept. These different cultural 
backgrounds are believed to be intricately linked with race and language, specifically due to 
the racially segregated history of South Africa.  
South African research on the matter has been quite inconsistent, with some studies 
finding significant differences between racial or linguistic groups and others finding no 
differences or even contradictory evidence to previous studies. It is interesting to note, 
though, that these inconsistencies and contradictions are solely found for the quantitative 
studies. The two studies that incorporated qualitative methods both found significant 
differences in IND-COL (or related concepts) as a function of race or language (Booysen, 
2001; Valchev, 2012). The inconsistencies with the quantitative research may be a result of 
the widespread inconsistency found in measuring IND-COL in general. With no clear 
standard with which to measure IND-COL, the variety of tests used may explain the variety 
of results obtained. Furthermore, many of the studies attempting to quantitatively study 
differences in IND-COL as a function of race or language did not pay much attention to the 
actual validity of the measures they used. This is a big problem since all currently readily 
available IND-COL measures were constructed internationally. This study, however, has 
shown that the HVIC is a valid and reliable measure to use in SA. If race or language were 
good predictors of IND-COL, the scores on HVIC should therefore have significant 
differences as a function of those two variables. This, however, was not entirely the case. 
 
Significant differences between racial groups were found. Specifically, Africans 
tended to be more collectivistic than Whites, which supports the findings of Valchev (2012) 
and Booysen (2001), and also supports the generally held notion that Africans are more 
collectivistic than Whites (Mwamwenda, 2004; Thomas & Bendixen, 2000). What is 
interesting to note, though, was that Whites were not especially high on individualism. In 
fact, there were no significant differences in IND as a function of race or language. Only Sex 
(or rather gender most likely) was found to vary significantly on IND. While this does seem 
to contradict previous research such as Hofstede (1980) or Thomas and Bendixen (2000), the 
discrepancy may be explained through differences in the measures and also the samples used. 
Both these two previous studies used the VMS that only measured IND expressly, with the 
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implication that a low score indicates high collectivism. They also both targeted managers or 
corporate employees, and were also done over a decade before Apartheid ended or very 
shortly after the new South Africa was created. This study, on the other hand, used a 
bidimensional IND-COL instrument with university students, and over two decades after the 
end of Apartheid. The cultural dynamics of the groups under investigation are not very 
comparable as a result. van Dyk and de Kock (2004) as well as Vogt and Laher (2009), 
however, did use student populations, but they did not find any significant differences 
between racial groups re IND-COL. Again, though, they used a unidimensional instrument, 
and were also conducted less than a decade after the end of Apartheid. Lastly, it could also be 
possible that intra-group variability in scores may have obscured any significant mean 
variations in scores due to the smaller samples sizes of those studies.  
 
The predominant use of unidimensional measures of IND-COL in previous research 
makes the results of this study not quite directly comparable with the results of those studies 
and so caution should be taken when doing any comparisons. Nevertheless, the VSM based 
studies found high levels of IND, which this study did not. The two student population 
studies on the other hand found middling results for the expressly COL instruments, which 
may be somewhat more in line with the results of this study. Although most participants in 
this study scored higher on COL than on IND (with only the exception of the Afrikaans 
group), their IND scores could not really be considered low either. Mean scores for IND and 
COL were above 50 (out of a maximum of 72) for all groups. It may be possible that the 
existing IND characteristics within the participants of the other student based studies may 
simply have pushed the total COL scores slightly lower. 
Ultimately, however, in recent years there has been an increasing shift towards 
understanding IND-COL as bidimensional or even multidimensional. The individual is never 
only IND or only COL, but a combination of the two, often depending on context. Hofstede 
also acknowledged the fact that the individual may possess both individualistic and 
collectivistic characteristics simultaneously. Therefore, it may not be surprising that the 
greater consistency has been with methods that do not try to force a unidimensional structure 
on the IND-COL relationship. The results of this study further supports this shift towards a 
bidimensional conceptualisation of IND-COL. A conceptualisation that is likely a more 
accurate reflection of social orientation than the unidimensional models used before, and so 
may provide more consistent results in the future. 
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Significant differences were found between racial groups in terms of their overall 
COL, but how well does race actually predict COL? How accurate would it be to use Race as 
an indicator of COL attitudes?  
Only accounting for less than 2% of variance in IND scores, the predictive value of 
race is meagre at best for IND. Predictive value of COL, however, was somewhat better with 
just under 7% accounted for, indicating a non-negligible predictive value for race and 
language regarding COL.  The strong correlation between language and race also indicates 
that these two variables are intricately linked with each other, even though neither may be 
strong indicators of preference for a certain type of self-concept. That being said, a few 
statistically significant predictors did exist between some of the racial or language groups, 
with the most notable being that of African Language speaking individuals when compared to 
English speaking individuals. In line with other qualitative research on self-concept in South 
Africa, African language speaking individuals tended to have significantly higher predicted 
scores for COL than English speaking individuals. Looking at the means a sizable difference 
could also be seen between these two groups in terms of mean COL scores (55.5 for English 
vs 59.4 for African). A relationship does therefore exist between race and language and COL, 
but predicting COL based on these two categories may not be very accurate. Over 90% of the 
variance in COL scores could not be attributed to racial background or linguistic differences. 
IND scores could not be significantly predicted at all by neither race nor language. The 
highly similar pattern for mean subscale scores across racial and linguistic groups also seem 
to indicate that South Africans in general really seem to be far more similar in terms of IND-
COL characteristics than different. Too many other factors seem to be at play in determining 
IND-COL levels in order to confidently rely on race or language as proxies for IND or COL 
tendencies at the individual level. 
 
The racially segregated past of South Africa may still be the reason that some 
significant differences do exist, especially at the group level. If this is the case, whether these 
differences will still exist in 5-10 years is debatable. As interactions amongst the different 
racial or linguist groups increase, so will the spread of ideas, norms, symbols and concepts 
become more diffuse between these groups. Recent South African student social movements 
like Rhodes Must Fall have even started altering physical institutions and symbols (Price, 
2015). Thus over time a new more inclusive cultural context could be created and shared 
across racial or linguistic divisions. This would inevitably then lead to an increase in a 
specific type of self-concept being primed across racial or linguistic divides, since the range 
78 
 
of cultural tasks or behaviours accessible for inclusion in the self would be more homogenous 
for all South Africans. South African students in particular, living in the cultural melting pots 
of university life, likely already have access to a unique blend of cultural tasks, distinctly 
different to what may be available in other institutional contexts within South Africa. 
Differentiating students in terms of IND-COL according to race or language alone may 
therefore be particularly difficult. 
 
So what is the state of IND-COL in SA? Previous qualitative research indicates that 
there seem to be distinct differences, but this has not been consistently found quantitatively. 
The known methodological issues surrounding cross-cultural psychometric measurement 
would lend credence to the possibility that the measures that have been used in the past were 
simply not capable of accurately capturing the nature of IND-COL in SA. This sentiment is 
further strongly highlighted by the vast variety of IND-COL measures out there, and the fact 
that researchers cannot even agree on the exact dimensionality of the construct(s) they are 
attempting to study. It would seem, though, that the four factor model, with IND-COL 
conceptualised as bidimensional fits the South African nature of IND-COL from a 
psychometric point of view. Would a measure that conceptualises IND-COL as 
unidimensional still have the same validity? This is unclear. The inconsistent findings of the 
past throws this in some doubt. What is clear, however, is that with inconsistent findings from 
previous research, and inadequate predictive power in this study, quantitatively predicting 
IND-COL preferences according to race or language should be done with caution.  
 
Studying the link between IND-COL and ANA-HOL in a South African student population 
Due to the problems associated with using race or language to predict IND and COL 
preferences a unique problem was encountered as to how to proceed in testing the theorised 
link between IND-COL and ANA-HOL. Using race or language as proxies for IND and COL 
became untenable, so a different method for finding IND and COL groups was needed. 
Based on the sound psychometric properties of the survey, it was believed that 
categorising individuals according to their HVIC scores instead of race or language should 
provide two groups of South Africans distinct in their preference for either an independent or 
interdependent self-concept. These two purposefully selected groups should then, 
theoretically, perform significantly different on the two ANA-HOL tasks used in this study. 
This, however, was not the case. With the exception of the amount of visits to the 
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backgrounds of the images during the eye-tracking stage, the purposefully selected IND and 
COL groups did not statistically perform any different. Even that single case of statistical 
significance was biased due to three outliers within the IND group. It was also quite 
interesting to note that even though both groups spent more time looking at focal objects than 
they did at the backgrounds, both also did significantly worse at correctly recognising objects 
when the backgrounds were altered. This points to significant context sensitivity for the 
whole sample in general, regardless of the group they were in. In other words, being 
classified as high on IND and low on COL or vice versa, did not seem to make any difference 
to which perceptual style was used in the laboratory tasks. What is very strange was that the 
participants seemed to display a more analytic eye-movement pattern, but the memory task 
indicated a more holistic perceptual style. But what exactly does an analytic eye-movement 
pattern look like?  
In the original study by Chua et al. (2005) the argument followed that the Americans 
would be more independent and thus use an analytic perceptual strategy in the tasks, while 
the Chinese would be more interdependent and thus use a more holistic perceptual strategy. 
The results seemed to bear this out with the Americans spending much more time looking at 
focal objects than the Chinese, and the Chinese also performing worse on the recognition task 
than the Americans when contexts were altered. Comparing the South African samples to the 
original study found that the South Africans (regardless of IND-COL classification) 
performed very similar to the Chinese, in both the eye-tracking and object recognition phase. 
This would imply that the South Africans used a more holistic perceptual strategy when 
compared to the Americans from the original study. This is somewhat in contradiction to 
what theoretically should have happened. The two South African groups were purposely 
chosen according to the IND vs COL preferences, and therefore should have been quite 
distinct in their self-concepts, and consequently distinct in their perceptual strategies. Not 
only did they perform the same as each other, their performance seemed to match the holistic 
performance of the Chinese interdependent group from the Chua et al. (2005) study. Does 
this mean South Africans prefer a holistic perceptual strategy regardless of self-concept? 
Perhaps not. 
 
Other studies that also sought to use eye-tracking to study differences in perceptual 
styles could not replicate the findings by Chua et al. (2005) either; one of them also using the 
exact same stimuli used in the original study (Evans, Rotello, Li, & Rayner, 2009; Rayner, 
2009; Rayner, Castelhano, & Yang, 2009; Rayner, Li, Williams, Cave, & Well, 2007). Evans 
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et al. (2009) also found that both groups tended to pay more attention to focal objects than 
backgrounds, and also that recognition accuracy for both groups (Americans and Chinese in 
their study) suffered when old objects were shown on new backgrounds.  This again indicates 
that context sensitivity was not dependent on culture. Evans et al. (2009) also concluded 
through Receiver Operating Characteristic curve analyses that the differences in recognition 
scores in the Chua et al. (2005) study were most likely due to more liberal response biases in 
their American sample. The results of the current study also match the results of Evans et al. 
(2009) far better than that of Chua et al. (2005). 
In a recent study Masuda et al. (2016) also looked for differences in eye-movement 
patterns between European Canadians and Japanese. They made use of a change detection 
paradigm, and found that when changes were present, eye-movement patterns tended to be 
very similar regardless of culture. When there was no change present, however, European 
Canadians were found to spend far more time looking at focal objects than backgrounds, 
whereas Japanese spent an equal amount of time looking at focal objects and backgrounds. 
They believed that when changes were present, universal bottom-up attentional processes 
took effect and automatically directed attention to the salient features within the pictures (i.e. 
the altered feature in the scene). When there was no such salient feature, however, top-down 
attentional processes where used to a greater extent. These top-down processes are far more 
influenced by goals, aims, and our learnt understanding of the world, and therefore, a greater 
cultural bias can come into effect skewing performance. This would also explain the lack of 
differences in the study by Rayner et al. (2009), where they used odd or strange looking 
scenes to test for differences in eye-movement patterns. 
 
So what then can be concluded regarding eye-movement patterns, object recognition, 
and culture? While the authors of the contradictory studies by Rayner, Evans, and their 
colleagues did not believe the theory regarding self-concept and perceptual style was flawed, 
they felt that perceptual style may not actually be evident at as early a stage as occulomotory 
activity. The study by Masuda et al. (2016), however, supports the notion of eye-movement 
differences. The fact, though, that neither the eye-movement differences nor the recognition 
accuracy differences found by Chua et al. (2005) could be replicated by a number of different 
studies seems to point to problems with the specific materials or procedures used in these 
studies. Understanding scene perception from a cultural perspective still needs to take into 
account theories on general attentional processes. The findings by Masuda et al. (2016) 
demonstrates quite well the power of visual salience on grabbing attention, as do the results 
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by Rayner et al. (2009). The lack of differences found in this study and also in Evans et al. 
(2009) may simply be that the focal objects were in and of themselves highly salient objects, 
automatically drawing attention and ameliorating any possible cultural top-down biases. Why 
this did not occur in the original Chua et al. (2005) study is unclear. 
As for the recognition performance results, Evans et al. (2009) believes liberal 
response biases may be the cause behind the significant differences found by Chua et al. 
(2005), but the fact still is, that the Americans in the original study did spend significantly 
more time looking at focal objects than backgrounds (349ms vs 279ms). In both this study 
and that of Evans et al. (2009) the independent groups spent just as much time looking at 
focal objects and backgrounds as did the interdependent groups (between 200-260ms on focal 
objects or backgrounds across all groups). Furthermore, this was similar to that of the 
Chinese group in Chua et al.’s (2005) study. So all groups in these studies spent an equal 
amount of time looking at either focal objects or backgrounds, with the exception of the 
Americans in the original study. All groups also performed poorly when contexts were 
altered with the exception of the Americans in the original study. What this seems to indicate 
is an anomalous American independent group in the Chua et al. (2005) study, but most likely 
anomalous in their eye-movement patterns, i.e. time spent looking at the focal objects. Why 
they did so is not clear, but that may still be the reason for their improved recognition 
accuracy when contexts where altered. 
 
It is important to note at this point that certain methodological differences between the 
studies may have made accurate comparisons difficult. Not only did the various studies use 
completely different eye-tracking equipment and recording software, but they also recorded 
eye-movements at different frequencies (Evans et al., 2009; Rayner et al., 2009; Rayner et al., 
2007). This study also suffered from this drawback. Recording eye-movements at different 
frequencies may have significant effects on the data recorded, especially in terms of amounts 
of fixations recorded (Hvelplund, 2014). Consequently, results may simply have varied 
between the studies not as a result of a flaw in theory, but as a result of methodological 
differences. While the actual impact of these differences in eye-tracking methodology is 
unclear, the lack of standardisation certainly calls for caution in making outcome 
comparisons.  
Another possible factor that may be at work here, specifically regarding the results of 
this study, is the same as the explanation for the anomalous survey results: The measure used 
most likely did not accurately capture the full nature of IND-COL. Even purposefully 
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selecting the extremes, and essentially creating a unidimensional IND-COL contrast within 
the groups, did not create same contrasting effect in the ANA-HOL tasks. These findings 
mirror those of Kitayama et al. (2009). They compared the Singelis (1994) SCS to 
performance on the FLT, amongst other implicit culture sensitive tasks and found no 
significant correlations at all. Even amongst the implicit tasks themselves there was only one 
marginally significant correlation. It is interesting to note, however, that the SCS scores were 
quite inconsistent in terms of what would theoretically have been expected. For instance, it 
showed that the US sample was the most interdependent, while the Japanese sample the least 
interdependent, quite contradictory to previous studies. The implicit tasks, on the other hand, 
did reflect what would be expected from the different countries, e.g. Japanese made far more 
errors on the absolute than the relative task.  
According to the cultural task analysis framework, specific cultural tasks are linked 
with specific types of behaviours, including ANA or HOL cognitive strategies. It might be 
possible that the cultural tasks that items in the HVIC tap into are not necessarily those that 
specifically prime ANA or HOL cognition. Furthermore, because individuals vary in terms of 
the culturally endorsed tasks or behaviours they choose to engage in, if the measure does not 
include all of these various tasks or behaviours an accurate assessment may be problematic. If 
you ask someone whether or not they like chocolate ice cream and they say no, it would be 
quite incorrect to conclude that they do not like ice cream in general. This might be exactly 
what is happening with the IND-COL surveys. Each item in the survey typically only 
captures a single cultural task associated with IND or COL. If an interdependent person, for 
instance, has not chosen to incorporate into their selfhood those exact COL tasks included in 
the measure, then they would not be accurately assessed. The shortened HVIC might 
especially be vulnerable to this problem due to its small number of items. Without knowing 
and incorporating a significant portion of the range of cultural tasks that embody IND or 
COL into a measure, obtaining an accurate assessment of an individual’s preferred self-
concept would be quite difficult. Then linking this self-concept with ANA-HOL behaviour is 
even more difficult as the exact tasks that prime ANA or HOL behaviour would not only 
have had to be included in the survey, but would also have had to be incorporated by the 
respondent into his or her self-identity as well! 
 
This lack of comprehensiveness in the surveys may also explain the discrepancies 
between the qualitative and quantitative research on self-concept in South Africa. Due to its 
bottom-up approach in understanding behaviour, qualitative research is far more able to 
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incorporate the variety of cultural tasks associated with IND or COL when doing 
comparisons. The quantitative measures, on the other hand, make use of a selection of IND or 
COL tasks sourced from international samples. While these tasks may still occur within the 
South African context, their prevalence might differ considerably. There may also be a 
number of SA-specific tasks not captured by these international measures that are more 
strongly related to IND or COL in South Africa. Valchev (2012) found that a South African 
model of personality created from self-descriptions did not fit too well with Western models. 
In particular, self-descriptions regarding social-relational aspects of personality were not 
adequately covered in Western models such as the Five-Factor model, and needed more 
elaboration. If such a widely accepted model for personality needed adjustment for the South 
African context, it seems quite probable that current IND-COL models may be missing such 
context-specific nuances as well. 
Another possibility may be that the manner in which the dimensionality of IND-COL 
is conceptualised in the measure could impact on how it correlates with ANA-HOL 
behaviour. Employing a specific perceptual style would inherently exclude the simultaneous 
use of the other. One cannot employ an analytic perceptual style at the same time as a holistic 
perceptual style, the two are opposing ways of directing attention. A bidimensional 
conceptualisation of IND-COL, however, means an individual can incorporate cultural tasks 
from both IND and COL into their selfhood. There is no inherent mutual exclusion. A 
unidimensional conceptualisation on the other hand is more similar to the way in which 
ANA-HOL has been conceptualised, opposites on a single continuum. A unidimensional 
measure of IND-COL may therefore correlate much better with ANA-HOL behaviour. The 
fact that both Kitayama et al. (2009) and this study found poor correlations between 
bidimensional IND-COL scales and ANA-HOL behaviour provides some support to this 
theory. Especially if most countries have been categorised in terms of IND-COL according to 
Hofstede’s (1980) study, which used a unidimensional conceptualisation of the IND-COL 
relationship. 
Both Kitayama et al. (2009) and this study also aimed to create a unidimensional 
contrast within our samples through manipulation of scale scores. The problem with this may 
be that the items or cultural tasks that the measure was created from were still framed in an 
inclusive rather than exclusive manner. Manipulation of subscale scores may not therefore be 
able to ameliorate this as the individual was not forced to make a choice between an IND or 
COL self-concept, and consequently between ANA or HOL perception. 
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This study was ultimately unable to replicate the findings by Chua et al. (2005). Self-
concept did not appear to have any effect on perceptual style. Given the findings from other 
studies of eye-movement and culture, the reason for this may be due to specific features of 
the tasks involved, and is most likely not a result of flaws in the underlying theory. Issues 
with the psychometric measurement of IND-COL and its relation to ANA-HOL (amongst 
other methodological issues), may also have played a role. Whether the IND-COL/ANA-
HOL relationship exists within the South African context is therefore unclear. What this 
study did manage to do is raise a number of methodological issues concerning the study of 
cross-cultural cognition within a multicultural nation.  
Limitations and future directions 
The first clear limitation was the need to use a survey to recruit participants for the 
laboratory tasks. The problematic history of IND-COL surveys in the South African context 
made reliance on such means troublesome. Using race or language, however, may not have 
been a better choice as proxies for culture either. The continued use of such ambiguous social 
constructs in future research may lose its validity more and more as previously segregated 
groups integrate to greater degrees in the future. Research in the near future, however, may 
still find them to be significant factors or as somewhat valid proxies for culture. It may still 
be of some use to include such distinctions in future research designs to account for this 
possibility. 
Artificially attempting to create dichotomous groups out of surveys not created in 
terms of dichotomous constructs (such as in this study and in Kitayama et al. (2009)) may not 
actually provide two groups distinct in terms of the self-concepts they prefer. Therefore, 
attempting to correlate scores from these groups with ANA-HOL performance may very well 
be invalid or inaccurate. It may be better to use a survey that purposefully dichotomises IND-
COL just as ANA-HOL is dichotomised. It may also possibly be better to use continuous 
regression analysis rather than means comparisons when trying to correlate IND-COL with 
ANA-HOL. IND-COL is a continuum, even when orthogonally conceptualised, and so 
should be studied as such. 
The task used may not be the most accurate measurement of ANA-HOL behaviour. 
Other studies besides this one have found problems with the materials used by Chua et al. 
(2005). It may be useful to try other types of ANA-HOL tasks to study the link between self-
concept and perception. For instance, the FLT is possibly the most widely used of ANA-HOL 
tasks and has been used in numerous countries besides just American and East-Asian 
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contexts. For eye-tracking, change blindness may be a better avenue of investigation based on 
the findings of Masuda et al. (2016), but also on the previous studies on change blindness by 
Masuda and Nisbett (2006). More top-down purposeful attentional processes are probably 
more influenced by cultural factors than passive bottom-up processes. The inclusion of more 
than one ANA-HOL task may help with gaining an accurate picture of the perceptual style 
employed by participant groups. 
Similarly, the survey used here probably did not accurately capture IND-COL within 
the South African context. Using other surveys with a wider selection of cultural tasks may 
provide a better picture of IND-COL in the target groups. Especially measures that have a 
wider range of cultural tasks included in their item pools. 
Lastly, correlating these other surveys with more than just one ANA-HOL task may 
then also provide a better understanding of which types of cultural tasks (as depicted in the 
surveys) correlate better with which types of ANA-HOL tasks (as depicted in the laboratory 
tasks). 
Conclusion 
This study supported construct validity as well as reliability for the shortened HVIC 
in assessing IND-COL in South Africa. However, it raised a number of issues regarding the 
validity of race and language as proxies for culture. Concerns regarding the psychometric 
measurement if IND-COL in SA were also highlighted which requires further investigation, 
as the fault may lie in the narrow selection of culturally mandated tasks present in the survey 
used. This study also did not find support for the theory that differences in self-concept 
underlie differences in visual perception. Again, though, this may simply be due to flaws in 
the survey used to recruit participants or in the materials used to test for differences.  
This study did manage to identify various methodological issues that arise when 
attempting to study cultural differences in cognition in a multicultural nation such as South 
Africa. In fact, as the world becomes increasingly connected through social media and 
increased migration through porous national borders, equating nation-state with a single 
culture may become ever more difficult. This study clearly showcased the importance of 
obtaining accurate methods to assess self-concept, as well as the need to better understand the 
link between such assessments and ANA-HOL behaviour. If IND-COL, a cornerstone of 
cross-cultural research, cannot be accurately defined or measured then any inferences drawn 
regarding its influence on cognition are cast in doubt. Furthermore, if the values that prime 
ANA-HOL are not incorporated, then using these measures in future studies on culture and 
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cognition become unsound. To avoid this problem, more research is required to refine the 
measurement of IND-COL, and understand how such measures relate to or predict cognition. 
In order to maintain or enhance the validity of findings, these improvements are a must for 
any future research into culture and cognition within our increasingly multicultural global 
society. 
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